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A great deal has been written about the Chinese economy -- much of it nonsense
-- and the pegging of the yuan to the US dollar. I think a little theoretical
digression may be in order. If the world were on a gold standard, by that I
mean that all notes and bank deposits would be supported by a 100 per cent
gold reserve, the pegging of currencies would not be possible. Each currency
would represent a certain amount of gold. If currency A represented x gold
units and currency B represented 2x units of gold then the exchange rate would
obviously be 2:1. There would be no inflows or outflows of any significance
so long as the exchange rates stayed with the gold points1.
The classical theory held that gold flows brought about changes in price levels
which in turn would restore the exchange rate. Yet it was discovered that exports
and imports corrected themselves without any change in relative prices, meaning
that international gold movements did not take place according to the theory.
It was then determined that if a country's export income increased, the resulting
rise in domestic incomes would increase imports without any change in the price
level and therefore in gold movements. (This is sometimes called the theory
of transfer).
Clearly such a monetary system would be self-regulating2. But as soon as the
world moves on to a paper standard (sometimes called a managed currency) the
situation becomes one of indeterminacy, by this I mean that there is no built-in
governor regulating the value and flow of currencies. Once this happens it
opens the door to all kinds of monetary shenanigans.
This brings us to China's dollar peg. The Fed's loose monetary policy has
succeeded in driving down the dollar with respect to many other currencies,
particularly the Euro. Yet the yuan is still linked to the dollar despite China's
aggressive monetary expansion. How can this be? Surely the dollar depreciation
should have broken the peg and forced the yuan to appreciate? Well, like all
things economic, we have been there before. The inter-war years saw a great
deal of currency manipulation (the Nazi manipulation of the mark was a wonder
to behold) to the extent that Gottfried Haberler observed:
The experience of recent years shows that it is possible, to a quite unexpected
extent, to isolate ... one country's price-levels from those of the outside
world and thus to maintain for a long period an exchange rate which is quite
out of line with purchasing power parity in the ordinary sense. (Gottfried
Haberler The Theory of Free Trade, William Hodge and Company LTD,
1950, p. 38, first published in 1933).
Manipulating currencies is not a costless exercise, far from it. To prevent
the yuan appreciating against the dollar China's central bank (People's Bank
of China) has to print more and more yuan with which to buy dollars. While
this has been going on domestic credit expansion has reached dangerous levels.
M2, currency and credit has been racing ahead at more than 17 per cent a year.
This is akin to a runaway monetary train. Not surprisingly, manufacturing investment,
real estate and the stock market are booming. Since last year alone the Shanghai
stock market index has rocketed by more than 300 per cent. This has all the
earmarks of a classic boom.
The PBOC is certainly not blasé about the situation. It has raised
interest rates four times this year, with the one-year rate now standing at
7.02 per cent. These increases have not even dented the boom. This has led
the PBOC to make noises about further interest rate hikes. It can make all
the noises it likes, but this monetary-driven boom is going to require a little
more fortitude on the part of the bank. The problem is not a purely monetary
one. There is the vital question of the capital structure to be taken into
account, a question that will have to be left for another article. Suffice
to say for now that the distortions caused by a reckless monetary policy will
require painful adjustments.
Wu Xiaoling, deputy governor of the People's Bank of China, is reported to
have said that it might take a year or so to determine whether interest rates
are negative. This is a damning indictment of the PBOC's monetary policy and
clearly indicates that interest rates have a long way to go before they puncture
the boom. There is some talk of applying more aggressive open market operations
to reign in liquidity. If the PBOC wants to squeeze liquidity then it must
put an end to monetary expansion. If it fails to do so then eventually real
factors will operate do the job for it.
In the meantime, minor changes to the dollar-yuan exchange rate are not going
to make much of a difference. Monetary policy has been slowly tightening in
the US. There is always a lag between changes in monetary policy and output
and prices. But there is also the exchange rate. The dollar could stabilize
while the yuan continues to inflate. The US could then find itself in a position
where the yuan starts falling against the dollar.
All we can say with certainty is that a world in which currencies are at the
mercy of central banks is one in which predictions of exchange rate movements
can be akin to gambling.
1. Gold points are the upper and lower limits that regulate the flow of gold
and are set by transport costs. If the value of gold in once country rises
above the gold import point then gold will be imported. Should the value of
gold fall below the export point then gold will be shipped out.
2. It was a quasi-gold standard in the sense that gold was held as a fractional
reserve against the total supply of notes and bank deposits. According to Jacob
Viner between 1850-1890 the gold reserves of the English banking system never
exceeded 4 per cent. (Jacob Viner Studies in the Theory of International
Trade, Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1937, p. 264).
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