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Originally published by www.focuspointpress.com on
June 18, 2007
CTA
ConfidentialSM
"An ongoing series of qualitative investigations
into managed futures trading programs"
SPECIAL CASE STUDY
Managed Futures:
A Model for Incubating Talent
The idea of traders staking other traders for a slice of profits is probably
as old as trading itself. Fast forward to the late 1970s and one unearths Commodity
Corp. which is remembered for launching the renown careers of Michael Marcus
and Bruce Kovner. And in 1983 Richard Dennis is legendary for having made a
bet with William Eckhardt which led to his recruiting and training the "turtles."
One of Richard Dennis' earliest if not first client was Bradley N. Rotter,[1] who
established a successful track record by investing early with traders like
Joe and Bob Hickey, Willis-Jenkins, Mississippi River, EMC Capital and Hawksbill
Capital. In 1990 Rotter founded a company called The Echelon Group with the
idea of forming joint ventures with talented traders and then helping them
grow into niche money management firms.
Then there is Arpad "Arki" Busson, who began his career raising capital for
Paul Tudor Jones and is the founder of EIM Group with $8bn in assets. Busson
made his name betting not in stocks, bonds or derivatives, but rather in upstart
managers some who became hedge fund titans.[2]
The common thread between these trailblazers is the niche segment within the
alternative investments industry they got their start in -- managed futures.
Managed futures has always been the little kid brother to the hedge fund juggernaut.
Nonetheless its impact upon the industry is writ large in two significant and
related ways: first, the managed futures industry unlike its brethren hedge
funds operate in a highly regulated environment; second, this same regulated
environment which imposes disclosure and reporting requirements lends itself
to fomenting lower barriers of entry for new talent to evolve.
Money managers within the futures industry operate under registrations either
as Commodity Trading Advisors (CTA) or Commodity Pool Operators (CPO). The
latter in practice is a regulated hedge fund,[3] but
it is the CTA structure we're most interested here.
Key to the development of any emerging trader is the ability to establish
a legitimate performance record and quickly raise assets. Managed futures addresses
both of these concerns.
With respect to raising client investments, managed accounts are an established
and widely accepted vehicle within the managed futures industry. This arrangement
provides a variety of benefits from the investors' perspective. Advantages
include the fact that futures accounts are mark-to-market daily, transparent
and easy to monitor, and most importantly liquid in the sense that an investor
can easily fire a CTA (as a matter of practice CTAs usually liquidate positions
on instruction in 24 hours or even less). On this basis it can be argued that
the managed account structure is a more attractive vehicle for investors who
focus on emerging traders, especially when compared to concerns about hedge
funds' delay in performance reporting (often it is quarterly), lack of transparency,
as well as investment lock-ups and intermittent redemption periods.
Sophisticated investors in managed futures utilize what is known as the cross-margin
account structure where a cash account is capitalized and collateralizes trading
accounts traded on a nominal or notional basis. The result is a customized
multi-advisor portfolio with the ability, at least hypothetically, to control
the leverage utilized by CTAs that capital is allocated to.
Managed accounts provide several advantages for emerging traders too. The
legal, administrative and audit costs in setting up a hedge fund can be prohibitive
and requires traders to try and raise at least $5 to $10 million in client
assets before they commence trading. Meanwhile, it is not uncommon for CTAs
to establish themselves starting with $100k in assets. Minimum account sizes
within the industry range from $25k (this is the exception rather than the
rule) to $5 million, with smaller minimums obviously making it easier to attract
clients.
The other advantage managed futures provides emerging traders -- a regulated
environment for establishing a money management business -- is exactly that
aspect which many traders perceive as a major disadvantage. It is in actuality
quite the opposite situation.
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the industry's self regulatory
organization, the National Futures Association, have set forth clear accounting
and disclosure guidelines with respect to CTA managed account composite performance
reporting. The rules are also well established in regards to disclosure of
client trading versus proprietary trading as well as hypothetical performance
presentations.
There are too many nuances for this article to delve into a detailed examination
of certain issues regarding reported CTA performance data. Suffice it to say
that the formalized composite methodology and the ability to publicly disseminate
composite performance numbers on managed accounts, something which is a significant
regulatory constraint for private placements, is a great boon to emerging CTAs
in terms of their ability to publicly market their track record.[4]
In fact, the only consistently reported data in the early days of alternative
investments initially came from CTAs, not hedge funds. This data became the
basis for an academic body of research on managed futures which includes studies
by Lintner (1983), Baratz and Eresian (1985, 1989), Oberuc (1990) and Schneeweis
(1996) to name a few.
One can point to the beginning of the institutionalization of alternative
investments as partly a result of CTA performance tracking databases such as
Managed Account Reports which grew into MAR/Hedge, and TASS Management which
became acquired and is now Lipper/TASS. These organizations, like many focused
on managed futures in the 1980s and 1990s, subsequently evolved from boutique
businesses to industry insiders within the hedge fund universe.
This returns us to the original idea that managed futures is and has always
been a fertile area of the industry for developing emerging talent apart from
those with institutional pedigree.
Managed futures remains mainly a boutique shop industry. Start-up costs are
relatively immaterial and many CTAs are or began as one-man shops by leveraging
proprietary track records, registering with the NFA and filing a disclosure
document. Established industry databases collect and present CTA performance
via websites such as www.ma-research.com and www.barclaygrp.com.
At the same time, there is an established network of Introducing Brokers (IBs)
and Associated Persons who focus primarily on marketing CTA programs.
There are pitfalls, however. Due diligence on many of these operations would
reveal that they are light on the operational side. While certain administrative
activities can be outsourced, it still remains the trader's responsibility
to establish sound practices and comply with the ever-expanding burden of rules
and regulations. Yet a trader focused on operations and marketing is not focused
on the markets, research and trading.
Another approach to starting up a CTA is partnering with operationally minded
personnel that can relieve many of the administrative requirements from the
trader's shoulders.
This is the approach my business partner and I took when we established Cervino
Capital Management LLC, a CTA and RIA. Leveraging my background with Rotter
in the 1990s incubating emerging traders and then running the operations-side,
I co-founded Cervino with Davide Accomazzo. Davide also has prior experience
in managed futures previously running a CTA as a one-man operation as well
as an offshore hedge fund.
Besides the segregation of duties -- Davide is Cervino Capital's principal
trader and concentrates his attention on the markets -- development of our
trading program began by first considering how we would differentiate our product
from competitor programs. We achieved this by creating a well-defined yet robust
mandate in which the trading program operates. This was done in view of what
we thought prospective clients would desire in terms of various factors including
but not limited to upside performance objectives versus allowable equity volatility,
margin-to-equity utilization which allowed leverage through notional funding,
and a best practices approach to operations.
This is atypical of how many CTAs get their start, and reveals other questions
for investors to consider when allocating to an emerging CTA program, including:
applicability of proprietary results as representative of prospective trading
in client accounts; amount of leverage used to generate returns, serious consideration
and commitment by trader as to the program's capacity limitations; as well
as accessibility and organizational professionalism.
Unfortunately, while "past performance is not necessarily indicative of past
results," there is a tendency with many who invest in managed futures to chase
hot performance. Rather, what should take priority in investor's thinking is
the robustness of the underlying trading strategy as it pertains to varying
market environments -- when does an approach work best, when does it not work
and how does the CTA manage risk and drawdowns during such periods?
Investors who invest with emerging CTAs (and the same applies to investing
in established CTAs) should seek to develop robust multi-advisor portfolios
with these questions in mind.
Likewise, if making allocations to emerging CTAs is considered an attractive
investment, then what about the business model of incubating CTAs? The economies
of scale that derive from leveraging standardized and professional operations
with multiple sources of trading talent, has from my experience, always been
an attractive opportunity.
[1] Futures
Magazine, "Rotter thrives on investing from the gut" by Staff, published February
1991
[2] Financial Times, "To
live and dream hedge funds" by Stephen Schurr, March 29, 2006
[3] Report of The
President's Working Group on Financial Markets, "Hedge Funds, Leverage, and
the Lessons of Long-Term Capital Management," April 1999
[4] Note: this is
not necessarily applicable to CPOs who mostly operate concurrently under the
same SEC exemption rules as hedge funds; CTAs are normally not subject to such
rules because they trade managed accounts.
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