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Required reading for this article: The
very first paragraph of the very first post I made on this blog and "the
Great Global Macro Experiment".
Of course commercial real estate is going to fall. Why? For the exact same
reason residential real estate is falling. But, there hasn't been an oversupply
of commercial real estate, you say. Well, the oversupply is not the core reason
why residential is falling right now. Residential RE's problem is that easy,
cheap money brought upon wreckless, imprudent speculation from players who
were not well versed in the real estate game - and even
those who should have known better. The current oversupply is a byproduct
of that liquidity induced speculation. Why split hairs? Because the devil is
in the details. The downfall of CRE is the rampant speculation that caused
many to significantly overpay for assets that are quite illiquid and take significant
expertise and time to improve (or even sell), even incrementally. Not only
did they overpay, but they applied significant leverage as well, much more
than the industry norm.
A Quick Commercial Real Estate Primer: Pricing Commercial Real Estate
There are several ways to price and value CRE, but the simplest and most straight
forward is the capitalization rate (cap rate).
The cap rate is simply net operating income/price. The result is a yield that
you can use to compare to other investments in order gauge relative price/return
- such as the 10 yr. note yielding 4.114%. For instance, I buy a building for
$100,000 and it throws off $10,000 after all operating expenses. $10,000/$100,000
= .10 or 10% = the cap rate. Thus this building is priced at a 10% cap rate,
or priced by the seller to give the buyer a 10% return, unleveraged. This 10%
return priced into the building allows a 589 basis point risk premia over the
10 yr treasury. Why, you ask? Because the office building is much riskier,
being very illiquid, taking many months or years to close on and sell. The
office building inherently has risk of litigation, operational risk, and market
risk. It also requires a modicum of operational expertise, and in addition
there is credit risk (through your lessees(?) So, as you can see, the risk
premia is well deserved.
Now, many (in order to juice the return a bit) apply leverage through mortgages,
bank loans, etc. to spice up the return, albeit at the risk of higher volatility
of cash flows and the possibility of running negative cash flow in tight years.
Assume, I used 30% of my own monies ($30,000) to buy this building and borrowed
$70,000 for the rest. I now get that same $10,000 net operating income off
of a $30,000 cash outlay, vs a $10,000 cash outlay. So now I yield 33% return
instead of a 10% return due to leverage. Of course my astute readers realize
that the cost of this leverage was not factored in. Let's assume the debt service
for this loan is $4,900 per year. I must deduct that interest and principal
repayment from my operating profit. This is reality. Thus, my leveraged yield
is really something akin to 17%. Still not bad, and still better than 10%.
The realities of the liquidity boom generated leverage, the absence of
risk premia & how the combination of the two will bring down commercial
real estate
There are additional caveats to the use of leverage. For one, it greatly reduces
operating flexibility. If you paid all cash in the deal above, and two out
four of tenants move out or go bankrupt, your (variable) cashflows are not
as hindered by your debt service (fixed) which offers you the flexibility to
pay more bills until you replace your income. If you took on debt, you have
less room to maneuver since the debt service is a fixed cost. Of course, the
more debt you take on, the less room you have.
Now, over the last year or two, I have witnessed market participants purchase
apartment and office buildings at cap rates of,,,, hold your breath now,,,,,
1.5% -4.5%. That's right. These are supposed professionals, acquiring multi-million
or even multi-billion dollar risky assets yield less than a 10 yr treasury
or your local money market fund - much less. There are only way two ways to
justify paying a low cap rate:
- A clear path towards increasing net operating income, such as doubling
rents (this ain't gonna in this economic downturn with corporate earnings
disappointing and the residential housing stock at all time highs), or reducing
expenses, or -
- selling to an even greater fool at an even lower cap rate. With the easy
money drying up and CMBS market looking rather scary, fools that are easily
departed with thier money are increasinly hard to come by. Now, we can find
fools, still - but the money part is the kicker these days - And even if
you find a fool who still has some of his money, how do you convince even
him to pay between 0% to 1% return on his money for your risky asset when
treasuries are currently yielding ove 4%. This is not even taking into consideration
leverage - which would assuredely drive this asset into negative cash flow,
with NO MARGIN for ERROR in operating. Trust me, you will need a margin for
error. Everyone makes mistakes, even me. I made one back in the early '90s...
:-)
Sam Zell, one of the most successful real estate investors of our time, sold
his Equity Office Properties Trust of Class A and B buildings to Blackrock
for what I assuredely thought was a fools price. When I saw the numbers, I
said easy money or not, there is an ass for every seat. Well, little do I know.
Blackrock found someone to pass the cherry on to, and in near real time at
that - and they paid even lower cap rates than Blackrock did. Hats off to the
Blackrock folk. You found the guys at the very tip top of the market to drop
those cap rates off on.
Now, the problem for the last guys to buy these properties (as Sam Zell sits
there smiling on his $21 billion pile of cash) is that it is going to be nigh
impossilbe to find someone who will pay a ZERO cap rate, and try as you might
it will be damn hard to raise lease rates amongst an economic hard landing
and negative trending earnings... And thus, this is the fate of commercial
real estate. The many guys who overpaid, will get burnt as values tumble from
their peak bubble highs. Old school real estate guys email me and say they
never even heard of 5, 6 and 7 percent cap rates until recently (after 30 years
in the biz). Well, some of these guys are pushing zero (literally 1.5% to 3
and 4%).
So I told my team to find the low cap rate buyers so we can short 'em. We,
of course, started looking at the profile of those who bought from Blackrock
(I mean, who wouldn't?) and then moved on when we saw that their were some
entities that were in some real (and I mean real) trouble. Here are a couple
of companies that we passed on because they weren't bad enough off:
Vornado - implied cap rate of 4.2% (currently about that of a risk free note,
but fraught with risk), and debt to equity of 163%. This means $1.63 of debt
to every dollar of equity or in terms of residential real estate.
Equity Residental - implied cap rate of 5% (currently about that of a risk
free note, but fraught with risk), and debt to equity of 193%. This means $1.93
of debt to every dollar of equity. Inserted comment: Error correction, hat
tip to Kiku below. It has been pointed out in the comments that published
equity numbers are misleading for REITS, which is why we measure portfolio
value independently, as we did with the mononline
insurers and the homebuilders.
Could you imagine going to a bank (like Countrywide, with mortgage backed structured
products insured by Ambac) and saying, "Hey, I'd like to borrow twice what
my house equity is appraising for, and I want to do it now, Dammit!" :-) Alas,
this is what "The Great Global Macro Experiment" has wrought.
If you think these numbers might look just a little hairy, just wait and see
the numbers of the companies that I am actually shorting. The one's above were
actually cut off of the short's short list, so to say. Once you see, you will
be a believer just like me - commercial real estate is on its way down. See
comments below for more on the accuracy of the book calculations I use in my
analysis vs. used in this story.
Details of transactions for sale of properties by Blackstone Group
| Date |
Particulars of transaction |
Purchaser |
Amount |
| 12th June, 2007 |
Sold Extended Stay Hotels |
The Lightstone Group LLC |
$8 billion |
| 9th August, 2007 |
Sold 38 assets comprised of 106 office buildings and 5.9 million square
feet in San Diego, Orange County, San Francisco, Seattle, Portland and
Salt Lake City. The properties are from the CarrAmerica West Coast Collection
that Blackstone Group purchased last year as part of a national portfolio. |
GE Real Estate-owned Arden Realty |
NA |
| 17th July, 2007 |
Merlin Entertainments Group, the leisure park operator owned by Blackstone,
sold its property assets toLondonproperty firm Prestbury Group plc owned
by real estate investor Nick Leslau. |
Prestbury Group plc |
$1.27 billion |
| 27th August, 2007 |
Sold 9 suburban Chicago office complexes to GE Real Estate. Blackstone
acquired these properties when it bought Equity Office Properties Trust. |
GE Real Estate |
$1.05 billion |
| 27th August, 2007 |
Sold a portfolio of downtown Chicago properties to Tishman Speyer. Blackstone
acquired these properties when it bought Equity Office Properties Trust |
Tishman Speyer |
$1.72 billion |
| 9th February, 2007 |
Sold 6.5 million square feet of Manhattan office space Macklowe Properties.
Blackstone acquired these properties when it bought Equity Office Properties
Trust. |
Macklowe Properties |
$7 billion |
|
Reggie
Middleton
Reggie Middleton, LLC
Perpetual Interests, LLCTM
http://boombustblog.com/
Who am I?
Well, I fancy myself the personification of the free thinking
maverick, the ultimate non-conformist as it applies to investment and analysis.
I am definitively outside the box - not your typical or stereotypical Wall
Street investor. I work out of my home, not a Manhattan office. I build my
own technology and perform my own research - in lieu of buying it or following
the crowd. I create and follow my own macro strategies and am by definition,
a contrarian to the nth degree.
Since I use my research as a tool for my own investing
to actually put food on my table, I can stand behind it as doing what it is
supposed too - educate, illustrate and elucidate. I do not sell advice, I am
not a reporter hence do not sell stories, and I do not sell research. I am
an entrepreneur who exists just outside of mainstream corporate America and
Wall Street. This allows me freedom to do things that many can not. For instance,
I pride myself on developing some of the highest quality research available,
regardless of price. No conflicts of interest, no corporate politics, no special
favors. Just the hard truth as I have found it - and believe me, my team and
I do find it! I welcome any and all to peruse my blog, use my custom hacked
collaborative social tools, read the articles, download the files, and make
a critical comparison of the opinion referencing the situation at hand and
the time stamp on the blog post to the reality both at the time of the post
and the present. Hopefully, you will be as impressed with the Boom Bust as
I am and our constituency.
I pay for significant information and data, and am well
aware of the value of quality research. I find most currently available research
lacking, in both quality and quantity. The reason why I had to create my own
research staff was due to my dissatisfaction with what was currently available
- to both individuals and institutions.
So here I am, creating my own research for my own investment
activity. What really sets my actions apart is that I offer much of what I
produce to the public without charge - free to distribute and redistribute,
as long as it is left unaltered and full attribution is given to the author
and owner. Why would I do such a thing when others easily charge 5 and 6 digits
annually for what some may consider a lesser product? It is akin to open
source analysis! My ideas and implementations are actually improved and
fine tuned when bounced off of the collective intellect of the many, in lieu
of that of the few - no matter how smart those few may believe themselves to
be.
Very recently, I have started charging for the forensics
portion of my work, which has freed up the resources to develop the site to
deliver even more research for free, particularly on the global macro and opinion
front. This move has allowed me to serve an more diverse constituency, which
now includes the institutional consumer (ie., investment turned consumer banks,
hedge funds, pensions, etc,) as well as the newbie individual investor who
is just getting started - basically the two polar opposites of the investing
spectrum. I am proud to announce major banks as paying clients, and brand new
investors who take my book recommendations and opinions on true wealth and
success to heart.
So, this is how I use my background and knowledge in new
media, distributed computing, risk management, insurance, financial engineering,
real estate, corporate valuation and financial analysis to pursue, analyze
and capitalize on global macroeconomic opportunities. I have included a more
in depth bio at the bottom of the page for those who really, really need to
know more about me.
Visit his blog Boom
Bust Blog.
Copyright © 2007-2009 Reggie Middleton
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