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Anemia...It's really no secret at all that the most recent recession
was one of the shallowest on record. The headline GDP numbers covering the
recessionary period and its immediate aftermath belie the fact that for labor
markets and corporate capital spending experience, it has been one of the worst
recessionary and post recessionary episodes in recent history. The shallowest
headline GDP recession in decades has been followed up, at least so far, with
one of the shallowest headline GDP recoveries in decades. The following table
details experience in the five quarters post official recession conclusions
of the last half century. We've averaged data point experience in the last
eight recessions to compare with current experience:
| Data Point |
Average Of Eight Prior Post Recessionary Periods |
Present Experience |
| Cumulative GDP Growth In 5 Qtrs Post Recession |
8.6% |
3.3% |
| Absolute Percentage Point Contribution To GDP In Post Recesion
5 Qtr Period |
| Personal Consumption |
3.6 |
1.79 |
| Nonresidential Investment |
0.80 |
(0.25) |
| Residential Investment |
0.93 |
0.33 |
| Inventories |
1.49 |
0.79 |
| Exports |
0.38 |
0.27 |
| Imports |
(0.57) |
(0.69) |
| Government Spending |
0.55 |
0.56 |
In addition to the current post recessionary period experiencing anemic growth
relative to the average of the prior eight post recessionary periods, current
experience as reflected in the numbers above is occurring amidst the greatest
of all post recessionary monetary and fiscal policy stimulus efforts ever seen.
As we and others have mentioned a number of times, the closest parallel to
our current experience is the post recessionary period of the early 1990's.
If we stripped out the early 1990's recovery data from the column in the above
table detailing average five quarter post recession performance, the numbers
would increase across the board with the exception of imports (imports being
an academic drag on the GDP calculation). Moreover, relative to the early 1990's,
both labor and corporate capital spending improvement is lagging badly at the
moment. In spending a minute or two looking at the above table, it's clear
that early in economic rebound periods, personal consumption, and everything
that goes with it such as inventory rebuilding, is critical to the ultimate
growth equation. Corporate capital spending follows a pick up in consumption
activity just as naturally as night follows day. But as we have chronicled
a good number of times now, during the most recent recession, personal consumption
never really turned down into negative rate of change territory as has been
the case in prior recession experience. Hence the contribution of personal
consumption to GDP growth post the recent official recession has been weak
relative to historical experience. There really was no downturn from which
to rebound in terms of consumption.
We bring this up because in very recent economic data, anecdotes have appeared
that suggest consumers are wobbling a bit. Maybe a good bit. And the recent
rise in longer dated Treasury yields so key as reference rates determining
the cost of consumer credit on many fronts are suggesting that headwinds to
forward debt based household consumption are beginning to blow a bit more furiously.
And what has accompanied these headwinds is the thought that the economy is
firming on a broad basis. The thought that corporate capital spending is being
passed the GDP growth baton from the personal consumer sector. Just as has
been the case in prior post recession experience.
The Changing Of The Guard?...Although one or two data points do not
make a trend, we are witnessing current anecdotes that suggest to us that cracks
are appearing in the ability of households to continue supporting the economy
looking ahead, at least in the fashion they have over the past three years
or so. The recent consumer credit report revealed an actual contraction in
month over month consumer credit outstanding. That might not sound like a big
deal, but do you know how many times this has occurred on a month over month
basis during the last ten years? Three, including last month. Looking back
across many decades, contractions in consumer credit outstanding have only
really occurred at significant recessionary troughs. As you can see in the
following chart that chronicles year over year changes in total consumer credit
outstanding, very much unlike prior post recessionary experience, the rate
of change in annual consumer growth is currently in decline. It's clear that
in historical post recessionary periods it has spiked higher as the forces
of pent up consumer demand were unleashed upon a more broadly recovering economy.
As for this cycle, there largely is no pent up demand to be expressed as we
move forward. At least not of a magnitude characterizing prior post recessionary
experience.
Of course the conventional Street response to this contraction in consumer
credit is that folks must simply be substituting mortgage debt for consumer
debt at the moment. Sounds reasonable enough. The only hook in the story is
that actual cash out refi's as a percentage of total refi's happen to have
been contracting relatively significantly in the second quarter. The following
chart details eighteen and one-half years of cash out mortgage refi activity
as a percentage of total refi activity. The bar in this data is set awfully
low as it measures the percentage of refi activity where the new mortgage is
only 5% or more in excess of the original loan amount being refinanced. As
you know, in most cases 5% of home prices won't even make a dent in terms of
possibly remodeling the kitchen. What the quarterly data that measures activity
through 2Q '03 shows is that the most recent quarter recorded a record low
reading for the data series of cash out refi activity as a percentage of total
refi activity. On a percentage of total loan basis, there was less cash pulled
out of real estate in 2Q than in any other quarter over the past few decades.
Certainly on an absolute dollar basis, though, it was far from the low.
Are folks really substituting mortgage debt for alternative forms of consumer
credit at the moment, or are households at last seemingly beginning the long
anticipated balance sheet reconciliation process? A process Greenspan apparently
believes, as per his most recent testimony, has already been completed. Of
course he could not be more incorrect as it really never even started in the
first place during this cycle. Although it's still far too early to tell, given
the recent contraction in consumer credit outstanding and concurrent drop in
cash out refi activity as a percentage of the refi whole, households may just
be at the forefront of leverage retrenchment. And here you thought it might
never happen.
Another anecdote that clearly took us by surprise a few weeks back was the
balance of trade report. And the surprise was not the fact that the deficit
contracted noticeably, but rather the makeup of the components that drove the
contraction. Exports actually grew while total imports remained basically flat.
Finally the triumph of a weaker dollar? Only partly. Exports of capital goods,
consumer goods and industrial supplies all registered gains that collectively
totaled $1.5 billion, but the highlight of the report in our minds was the
$1.2 billion contraction in imports of consumer goods. Maybe it's just a one-off
event, but on a $40 billion monthly trade deficit number, a contraction of
$1.2 billion in imported consumer goods stands out like a sore thumb. Either
Wal-Mart and friends decided to tighten up inventories in a vice grip, or this
is a tell tale sign of a US consumer unable to hold up the continued acceleration
in the importation of cheap foreign-sourced consumer goods.
Again, these are just anecdotes of recent note for now relating to consumer
activity. Far from in place or definitive trends at the moment. But if weakness
in consumer credit growth, cash out refi's and the importing of consumer goods
persists ahead, it will be telegraphing a message of a US consumer who is growing
quite weary relative to behavior of the last few years. Behavior that has been
the very support of the US economy. Maybe it's no wonder that a potential capital
spending revival has become the rallying cry for the equity market as of late.
The comments above relate to rate of change in consumer leverage acceptance.
Our final thoughts regarding the consumer are really nothing new. As you can
see in the following chart, as part of the overall theme of a lack of a decline
in consumer spending during the latest recessionary cycle, auto sales not only
held up, but even accelerated during the official recession. There was no downturn
this go around from which to recover. Again, clearly related to apparently
attractive consumer financing of the past, it leaves a currently recovering
economy without one of its key historical accelerants.
Furthermore, and maybe even most importantly, we may be witnessing the literal
rate of change peak in the housing cycle as we speak. With the very significant
back up in mortgage rates as of late, it's becoming a much greater possibility
than not. Recent new and existing home sales data were quite strong. While
existing home sales hit a record, new homes were just shy of record levels.
Likewise, the most recent housing starts data hit an absolute number not seen
since 1986. Has the upward jolt to mortgage interest rates over the last few
months caused former fence sitters to literally panic into short term real
estate purchase mode? It's a good bet that this is a big part of the rationale
for recent strength. Although the world isn't quite ready to come to an end,
it's starting to appear as if we have reached the peak of the housing cycle.
In addition to housing starts now being at a high not seen since 1986, starts
have been in the longest up trend in half a century at least during this cycle.
Moreover, US existing home prices as a percentage of median family income just
hit a new high for the post war era at least. Year over year, new home prices
have accelerated 17.5% and existing homes up 13.8%. In terms of both starts
and pricing, we believe the chances of us experiencing a rate of change peak
right here are much better than 50/50.
Not surprisingly, though, what may ultimately be much more meaningful to the
housing cycle this go around is plain old-fashioned cost of capital. It just
so happens that over the last three decades, every time the absolute level
of conventional thirty year mortgage rates has exceeded its twelve month moving
average for a meaningful period of time, housing starts have turned down. For
now, 30 year mortgage rates have spiked above their twelve month moving average
of the moment. The key in looking ahead, of course, is determining for how
long this will be the case. History tells us that the longer this relationship
persists, the more bearish the environment becomes for the homebuilders, at
least in terms of new housing start experience. The following charts is pretty
clear on the relationship of mortgage interest rates to their twelve month
moving average, and subsequent housing starts activity.
Lastly, in terms of housing, US existing home prices relative to median family
income just hit a new post war high. The prior high was seen in the early 1980's.
Quite simplistically, this relationship suggests that never on a macro basis
have existing homes been less affordable to US households anywhere in the last
half century than now. Again, this doesn't necessarily portend disaster ahead,
but rather leaves open the question of forward pricing and affordability issues.
From our perspective, housing industry anecdotes of the moment are quite suggestive
of cyclical topping experience.
Two large consumer driven engines of recent period economic growth appear
to be topping or having topped as we speak. Except for brief monthly spikes,
monthly auto sales have been trending lower for some time. For now, housing
sure looks like peak activity to us. Moreover, slowing cash out refi and consumer
credit expansion data suggest debt burdened households are at best taking a
break from accelerating credit expansion at the moment. The facts tell us that
it's more than just a reasonable possibility that the consumer that has really
been holding up the economy for the last few years is simply weary.
The Ultimate Relay Race?...Can the current economy experience an acceptable
passing of the GDP baton from the consumer sector to the corporate sector ahead
without either of these runners stumbling? Without the consumer athletes dropping
from exhaustion prior to a clean handoff to their corporate sector counterparts?
In the stands, the monetary and fiscal policy fans are giving it their all
in terms of encouraging the athletes. The cheering has never been more vociferous.
On the Street, market participants have already claimed relay race victory
as measured by the valuations they have accorded equity securities at the moment,
especially those companies cyclically sensitive to a broadly improving economy.
Can the corporate capital spending hopefuls reclaim the glory that was once
theirs in the mid-to-late 1990's? As you know, anything can happen, but let's
have a little look at a few facts that will hopefully help frame the upcoming
leg of the GDP relay race.
Although this data is a bit dated (it's the latest we have), capital spending
by approximate industry sectors in 2001 was as follows:
| CAPEX In 2001 |
| Industry Sectors |
$ Billions |
% Of Total |
| Finance, Insurance, Real Estate |
$171 |
24.1% |
| Manufacturing |
153 |
21.6 |
| Info/Tech |
106 |
15.0 |
| Construction, Mining, Utility |
84 |
1.9 |
| Retail/Wholesale |
59 |
8.4 |
| Other Services |
45 |
6.4 |
| Transportation & Warehousing |
41 |
5.8 |
| Health Care |
26 |
3.7 |
| Professional & Technical |
23 |
3.3 |
| TOTAL |
$709 |
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Of course as we look ahead, we have to ask ourselves just who will drive macro
corporate capital spending if indeed this phenomenon is to take place in a
significant manner. As we look at the table above for potential guidance as
to where strength may lie ahead, we have some very big sector players here
whose forward capital spending behavior is at the very least open to question.
In terms of finance, insurance and real estate, heavy spending in 2001 was
clearly related to technology infrastructure. Despite the anticipatory movement
in the tech stocks during the recent rally, the reality of actual meaningful
(more than simply replacement spending) tech spending is still elusive at this
point. Also, the recent reality of higher interest rates isn't exactly the
prescription for accelerating profitability in finance and real estate specifically.
Secondly, given the accelerated outsourcing of more of our manufacturing base
during the latest soft economic period and the continuing struggle of the overall
sector itself, just how much capital spending punch can we really expect from
manufacturing? Is GM or Ford ready to build new plant or remodel old plant
extensively? With certainty, they will need to replace worn out equipment,
but we see little reason to expect capacity expansion. Expansion that characterizes
significant capital spending upcycles. In terms of information or broader tech
industry capital spending, bellwether AMAT's experience pretty much says it
all. They are still shedding bodies after having done so in each of the last
two years. Broadly, tech remains plagued by overcapacity. Lack of pricing power
in the industry is simply testimony to the fact. Anecdotally, on the global
scene, China recently announced that by year end, all government ministries
will be required to purchase local (meaning Chinese produced) software at their
next upgrade cycles. Simply music to the ears of Bill Gates, Larry Ellison
and Craig Conway, right? Many of the service sectors you see above most levered
to interest rates in terms of forward profitability were the largest capital
equipment spenders in 2001.
There is no question that the fiscal and monetary stimulus of the moment is
going to spark some type of positive economic response ahead. It's already
started, at least as per the 2Q 2003 GDP numbers. But the singular largest
issue concerning this recovery is sustainability. Moreover, as we look back
at historical capital spending experience, we believe it is very important
to note that significant capital spending booms are a bit more anomalistic
that not. We suggest that banking on a large scale capital spending revival
above and beyond the real need to simply replace worn out capital stock at
the moment is still a bit premature. Especially following so soon on the heels
of the tech led capital spending boom of the late 1990's. The following chart
depicts capital spending (nonresidential fixed investment as a proxy) as a
percentage of total GDP over the prior four decades. It's our belief that very
significant capital spending booms have been created by anomalistic circumstances
as opposed to normal business cycle events.
In the two instances where capital spending in any cycle accounted for 13%
or more of total GDP over the last forty years, explanations appear relatively
logical. The energy related capital spending boom of the mid-to-late 1970's
was in clear response to the price spike of energy commodities during that
decade. Despite higher interest rates and a recession in 1980, capital spending
as a percentage of GDP just continued moving higher. In fact the build up of
energy capacity in the late 1970's and early 1980's led to decades of weak
energy prices to follow and a bust in sectors such as drilling and oil service.
There is simply no question that capital spending in the mid-to-latter portion
of the last decade was driven by the technology revolution upon us at the time
- telecommunications, hardware and software. Of course the little Y2K related
technology scare simply threw gasoline on an open tech related capital spending
fire. Again, a boom that created so much capacity globally that the industry
is still paying the price in spades in terms of sated demand and lack of pricing
power. Can we really expect a meaningful renewal of capital spending so soon
after the boom in the prior decade? We think not. Lastly, as you can see in
the chart, during huge booms capital spending only accounted for 13-14% of
total GDP at most. As we have shown you time and again, consumer spending is
what makes this economy go. And if we are even close to smelling a tired consumer
in the anecdotes we mentioned above, corporations will surely react by pulling
back on all but necessary capex. Just as they have done for the past few years.
For now, a few signs of life in corporate capital spending have shown themselves
in recent data. The 2Q GDP report revealed a pop in tech related business equipment
spending. During the period it was virtually all hardware related. But as you
can see in the following chart, broader spending in the economy on business
equipment has not yet even turned positive on a year over year rate of change
basis. Prior post recessionary recoveries have zoomed into double digit rate
of change acceleration territory in short order as far as business equipment
spending is concerned. The exception, of course, being the early 1990's. For
now, business equipment spending is recovering from multi-decade low rate of
change experience. We'll just have to see how far it goes from here. 3Q tech
industry earnings reports and management commentary should be awfully telling.
Although the recent industrial production report achieved the obligatory "beat
the expectations" characterization, it left little to warm one's heart. Excluding
vehicles and increased electric and gas utility output, the 0.5% headline industrial
production number was a whole lot closer to zero (or less). (Anecdotally, non-durable
consumer goods production declined 0.9%. Another wonderful consumer related
data point of the moment.) Again, in prior post recessionary periods, the annual
rate of change in durable materials industrial production (capital asset related
durables production) shot into double digit territory without even breaking
a sweat. So far this go around, we've just experienced a false start.
There is no question that if a true and meaningful capital spending upcycle
is in the works for the immediate future, we're still very early in the game.
We should be witnessing improvement in what you see above as well as many other
statistical data points as we move forward. It's clear that the manufacturing
indices (ISM) of late have been moving in the right direction. Even capital
equipment pricing in the most recent PPI report displayed a one month increase
of a magnitude not seen in almost two years. But a lot of what we see currently
in terms of capital spending strength is a bounce off of severely depressed
results of the past few years. A bounce that so far has all the earmarks of
replacement spending as opposed to new plant and equipment additions.
We'll leave you with one last anecdote regarding the cycle of capital spending
in economic cycles of the past. As you will see in the following chart, there
has been a highly correlated relationship between the year over year rate of
change in non-residential fixed investment and the headline capacity utilization
rate over time. We've speculated in the past on just which of these is the
chicken and which the egg. But leaving that aside, it's the historical symmetry
in directional movement that we believe is important ahead as a corroborative
validation of a true upturn in capital spending. As you will see below, over
the recent past the annualized rate of change improvement in non-residential
fixed investment has not as of yet been validated by an improvement in system
wide capacity utilization. At least based on historical precedent, we would
expect directional change symmetry to come into play at some point in the near
future. Either broad capacity utilization begins to improve or the recent rate
of change improvement in non-residential fixed investment (capital spending)
will be short lived. Maybe this relationship will be twisted or invalidated
in the current cycle given the incredible stimulus being applied to the economic
patient at the moment, but for now, we have the prior 35 years of relational
experience on which to lean. For now, we believe the following relationship
bears close monitoring, especially given the fact that the equity markets have
recently been waiting for no such validation.
If the consumer is beginning to wobble a bit, as we are seeing in current
numbers, a perfect GDP growth baton handoff to the corporate sector is imperative
in moving this economy forward. Never before has the economy been supported
by so much fiscal and monetary stimulus as we now experience. The most important
leg of the GDP growth relay race lies dead ahead.
The Winners Circle...One suggestion for a final relationship to keep
an eye on is the following. This is the relationship between the Morgan Stanley
cyclical index and the MS consumer index. As is clear, this has been a give
and take battle over the last four years with both sectors coming into and
out of favor on almost a scheduled basis. Almost like clockwork, this relationship
has bottomed during each October of the last three years and has peaked during
the third quarter in each of the last two. Do the cyclicals once again peak
relative to the consumer stocks shortly ahead, or break out to a new multi-year
high in terms of this relationship?
We believe the resolution ahead will be important on a number of fronts. First,
the invisible hand of the market will be casting an important vote as to the
potential for acceleration in GDP growth moving forward. A message worthy of
respect as we continue to watch the character of the unfolding stimulus driven
economic strength. Secondly, a break out to multi-year highs in the relationship
between cyclical and consumer stocks would be saying something about forward
looking bond market prospects. We find it more than interesting that at the
recent FOMC soiree, the Fed didn't even throw the bond market a bone. Not even
a scrap. This is two back-to-back Fed conclaves where the bonds have sold off
heavily post the meeting. Almost a complete switch for experience during the
infamous Greenspan tenure. Who knows, maybe the keeper of the above cyclical
and consumer indices knows something. After all, it was just a few weeks back
that Morgan Stanley was "urging" their clientele to purchase longer maturity
fixed income vehicles. If what you see above breaks out to a new high, that
just might not be such a good idea, will it?
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