|
Keeping in mind the old spring (coil) metaphor, or Say's Law, or even the
well known physics law - "every action causes an equal and opposite
reaction" - let's imagine interest rates were already pushed as low
as they could go by late 2002... to or beyond the boundaries of so-called equilibria.
But then (in the second quarter of 2003), imagine that interest rates were
pushed down even lower. I'm talking about long term rates, which the Fed typically
has less control over, and which were reported as sticky (unresponsive to the
Fed's rate cuts) in 2001. In other words, even while the FOMC slashed short
term rates from 6% to 2% in 2001, long term rates hardly fell that year (they
ranged from 5.5% at the beginning of the year to a low of 4.2%, but ended the
year at around 5% - see graph further below).
In fact, the only reason they fell to the 4% range to begin with was that
Treasury Undersecretary Peter Fisher pulled our leg about a suspension of the
30 year bond in October (2001) - on account that the surplus would inevitably
return, and that it would be less expensive for the government to issue shorter
term bonds in the meantime.
But medium and long term yields didn't stay down. They went down for a week
or two, then shot up real quick. That didn't stop the gang from trying again.
At about the same time, Greenspan was lobbying Congress for an expanded open
market operations mandate - to include longer term Treasuries and mortgage
backed securities on the basis that the ongoing budget surplus would eventually
make obsolete the effect of their normal operations in the shorter end of the
market (supposedly the pool of Treasury securities they are allowed to buy
and sell would dwindle because the surplus would be used to buy them back).
Believe it. They said it.
But presumably, the market did not believe it.
When they realized nobody was really buying the prospect of indefinite budget
surpluses another angle began to see the light of day. They called in the term "unconventional
tools". Specifically, the Fed said it now planned to force "long
term" rates down by buying longer term maturities. I'll be darned.
Same thing, different spin. You know the story. The term was circulated by
the press every time there was bad news, or whenever stocks fell too sharply.
It became a catch-phrase that fueled a climactic bond bubble into the summer.
Have a look at the chart of the 10 year Treasury yield below and notice the
late 2001 and early 2002 back up in yields (from 4.2% to 5.5%) - which we contend
was largely the reaction to the prior forced policy decline.
Remember, the bulls were breaking the Dow out then too, and they claimed the
rise in yields was due to a strengthening economy rather than inflation expectations
or failed policy. I guess they just couldn't take that last little push in
March 2002 though, because shortly after that stock prices plummeted.
Yes, I am telling you what you already know, that falling interest rates are
bullish for stocks, and rising interest rates just ain't good at all.
However, this time, when stocks turned down, yields really fell, particularly
after gold prices peaked early in June 2002 (as was also the case this past
March 2003) and as stocks just kept on falling.
The combination of a new bear market low in stock prices in September, widening
terror anxieties, and the threat (or promise) of "unconventional tools" that
circulated through Wall Street trading desks easily overcame the obvious inflationary
developments - such as a weak dollar, soaring housing market, and strong
commodity complex - and yields fell sharply into May 2003.
The
Fed wasted no time rousing deflation fears - we call it the head on method
of tackling inflation expectations.
Even after the rally in stock prices that finally got under way post March,
the promise of a yield cap reached a pitch investors could hear all the way
to China... literally! No doubt they bought bonds over car insurance.
The more they spun, the harder yields fell. It seemed to work. Stock prices
gained, just like they often do when that happens. In fact, I can't see how
the stock rally would have done without it.
In the end, as the stock and commodity markets increasingly crowded them out,
it turned out to be mostly talk.
They sure pushed this thing all the way to the wall.
But two key things happened. First, gold and commodity prices were stoked
by it, as they were in late 2001, and thus reaccelerated to higher highs. Second,
the interest rate spring unwound this time as it did after the mini-Treasury
rig effort of late 2001.
Let me ask, what better evidence is there that bond yields were pushed
below market than the fact that they just shot up at their fastest pace in
almost 20 years, and wiped out all the cuts back to July 2002 in one and
a half months? - such that the 10 year bond yield is back up to 4.5%,
not a heck of a lot lower than its 5.5% high in 2001.
I want to establish this fact. It's important. As the market sees through
this charade, gold prices are gonna get pushed higher, and so will yields.
How long can the Dow rise in the face of that?
It should be obvious that the Fed's open mouth policy impacted other markets
- stocks, commodities, etc. - significantly, as well as the economic aggregates
(on the way down to a 3.1% ten year bond yield at any rate), and that it will
equally if not unpredictably impact them in reverse on a jaunt back to the
5% range, or higher if we're really right.
It should also be evident that it's unfolding now (strong gold and rising
rates), as September encroaches, and the new stock trading season has begun.
For most of the year so far, markets have worked hard factoring in all the
bullish consequences of the Fed's policy. They haven't considered the other
side of the coin since last fall.
I am confident you'll soon see that the Fed's effort to unstick the yield
market in the last few years is not only self-defeating, but has clearly strengthened
the fundamentals of our overall gold sector hypothesis.
Going Into September
The US dollar ended down last week but finished up for its 3rd month in a row
in August. The move had no chart or technical significance and could simply
be countertrend.
The bulls rallied it up to its 200-day moving average the week before, straddled
resistance there for most of last week, then fell away from it by Friday and
bounced back up to it yesterday. The three month uptrend is intact; the last
highest short term low is at 95 on the trade-weighted index. The bears have
to push through there to signal a fresh down leg.
The US dollar index mirrors the European currencies most on the charts. Meanwhile,
the Canadian, South African, and Australian currencies so far have refused
to confirm the Euro and Swiss Franc's August lows.
Now, yen bulls are taking another stab at breaking out, finishing a bullish
outside day just yesterday. I can't imagine the Swiss Franc trading down much
if the dollar breaks down against the yen now, or if US stock and bond markets
CONTINUE to underperform the European markets in coming weeks - as they
have since the Euro peaked in June.
The gold sector continued strong last week amid bad Fed rumors and good headlines
for the global economy. We've said it before. They're climbing a wall of worry
- unlike Wall Street's current infatuation. Still, it's gold's role to lead,
and as strong as gold prices have been in recent months, bulls have yet to
break out.
Cutting Through the Euro Baloney
Japanese authorities say enough is enough on the yen's rise, that it's just
a correction in the euro that's causing it. The next day Treasuries pop as
if the Japanese were buyers. They usually are. It rarely fails - so far.
Meanwhile, the western media has other incentives. It says the euro is falling
because of either a) a global recovery led by Japan, or more typically b) a
global recovery led by the US; in both cases Japan and the US are said to be
benefiting more than Europe.
But we observe that hot money flows seem to prefer both Japanese and European
bonds & shares to US bonds & shares, and that the upward trending trade
surplus in Europe alone argues that the latest slide in the Euro is probably
just corrective / technical.
Dollar bulls would counter that the trade surplus is growing in both Asia
and Europe, which proves there is a US led global recovery underway.
We would counter, that if it were the case, that US equity markets would have
to perform even better than they are, or that interest rates would have to
practically double (in order to carry the twin deficits). Otherwise the greenback
would have to falter in order to correct the trade imbalances. There's no way
around it.
Yet the policy after math of the 90's bubble has kept many investors relatively
bullish on the dollar, despite its young bear market outgrowth.
Consider three important differences between now and then:
1) Where the strong dollar of the late nineties - propped up in part
by improving relative real returns in US assets stoked by currency crises
in Europe and Asia - was a self reinforcing boon to interest rates
and stock values, the weak dollar is typically the opposite.
2) Where the late nineties boom in US dollar denominated assets was at least
born out of the semblance of a tight monetary policy, the current 12 month
boom is born out of a no holds barred cowboy style inflationary policy whose
designers claim is intended to avoid the consequences of deflation.
3) Whereas the late nineties boom ran alongside an administration that at
least paid tribute to the idea of a balanced budget, the current boom is
a textbook case application of Keynesian deficit spending.
What does it mean?
In the United States in particular, it means disinflation is gone. Fiscal
prudence is gone. The hawks at the FRB, well, they've turned a blind eye. But
there are consequences.
Inflation expectations are likely to continue to rise, the dollar is likely
to remain weak, and interest rates are likely to soar... as we keep saying,
especially once most investors figure it all out. It's happening right before
your eyes. And it's precisely why we believe US markets have underperformed
all others over the past few months - not because of a global recovery trade.
Thus, we look at the Euro's correction as the product of countertrend forces
favoring the US dollar at the moment, which seem unsustainable for even a few
days longer (but may be).
One way or another, either the dollar has to fall in order to correct the
current account deficit, or interest rates have to rise. But at 25 times earnings
for the S&P 500, any significant increase in interest rates is likely to pressure
the dollar if it chokes off the official capital flows currently supporting
it. The more inflation there is, the more the dollar becomes overvalued, and
the more this process pressures interest rates higher tomorrow.
This is what gold prices have been predicting well since 2000, and it's been
coming to fruition. Always, under the patronage of the Fed, there is much more
inflation than productivity. There is no recovery trade. There's just the noise
typical of countertrend moves.
The remainder of this letter (Gold Stocks with the Most
Potential Upside on $100 Move in Gold to $475) is subscription only.
If you would like a free one week trial, please send us an email.
To view our subscription details click here: Subscription
Information
|