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The current monetary crisis has brought forth an avalanche of opinions on
what President Bush and the Fed need to do to arrest the dollar's decline and
prevent a recession. But what really needs to be done? The quarterly Anderson
Forecast by the University of California at Los Angeles is betting that
there will not be a recession, though there will be a significant downturn
in the rate of growth. Of course, there is the usual caveat that if consumers
reduce their purchases of big-ticket items this could bring on a recession.
It has yet to sink in that consumption does not drive an economy but business
spending does. (Standing
Keynesian GDP on its head: Saving not consumption as the main source of spending).
What one needs to do is examine aggregate business spending. And this means
spending on intermediate goods, i.e., inter-firm expenditures. This type of
spending is a key economic indicator that very few forecasters use. We've got
the same problem with mortgages. Bernanke is urging the banking system to write
down millions on housing loans in the hope that this would raise equity for
borrowers and avoid foreclosures. Behind this 'policy' there lurks our old
friend the consumption fallacy.
Legions of economic commentators are giving dire warnings that a combination
of jump in foreclosures and drop in inequity will depress consumer spending
and hence drive the country into recession. If we apply the Austrian approach,
however, we find that aggregate spending is actually about $28-$30
trillion, against which expenditure on housing is a tiny per centage.
Once again our economic pundits -- along with media commentators -- have gotten
hold of the wrong end of the economy.
Bernanke's Keynesian response to the monetary crisis he helped create is to
make it worse. By slashing the funds rate he fuelled inflation and put even
more downward pressure on the dollar. Just to show that he means business the
Fed is making $200 billion in Treasury securities available to the banks and
Wall Street investment houses. I take this as an assurance by Bernanke that
he will pump as many dollars into the economy as is necessary -- in his opinion
-- to avert a credit collapse and a recession, proving once and for all that
he never learnt a thing from studying the great depression.
Having taken the 'necessary' monetary measures the Fed still makes the risible
claim that it's targeting price stability. The lesson that Bernanke should
have learnt from the great depression is that trying to stabilize prices is
not only futile it destabilizes the economy and generates the boom-bust cycle.
I have warned on and off for sometime that loose monetary policies eventually
bring on a credit crisis if left to run their course. They also have the effect
of driving down the currency. What is being called "the dollar crisis" is really
a monetary crisis that few people understand. The effect of cutting the funds
rate has been to accelerate the dollar's decline. This signals that the markets
are anticipating that Bernanke's monetary policy will aggravate inflation.
Whenever a currency crisis strikes the cry for a "strong currency" from some
quarter or other always arises, usually accompanied by the assertion that a "strong
currency is in the national interest" and that it should "reflect economic
fundamentals". What is really in the national interest is a sound monetary
policy. Get that right and you will get your so-called fundamentals right.
These people have not grasped that if a central bank sets an inflationary course "economic
fundamentals" cannot stop it. Rather than face that fact some commentators
would sooner blame the regime of floating exchange rates. That monetary policy
is the reason why rates are dramatically changing against each other is one
thought that always eludes them.
It's an odd thing but even those commentators who are supposed to be economically
literate invariably write as if economic laws have nothing whatever to say
about exchange rates. Yet one economic theory states that rates are supposed
to ultimately reflect purchasing power and not the so-called wealth of a country.
Professor Ludwig von Mises once recalled how in 1919 a banker had told him
that the Polish mark should never have dropped to 5 francs
Poland is a rich country. It has a profitable agricultural economy, forests,
coal, petroleum. So the rate of exchange should be considerably higher.
(On the Manipulation of Money and Credit, Free Market Books, 1978,
p. 20. The article was first published in 1923).
Mises stressed that the value of a country's currency is determined by the
supply of and the demand for money so that "even the richest country can have
a bad currency and the poorest country a good one". (Ibid. p. 21). In other
words, monetary expansion is the fundamental cause of a falling exchange rate
and not speculation or some mysterious link with another currency. From this
we conclude that the basis of a "strong currency" is a sound understanding
of the nature and power of money.
A reader emailed me to say that a country with a weak-currency cannot have
a healthy economy. The point is that a weak currency is a symptom and not a
cause. And even some of those who recognise this fact still do not grasp just
how dangerous loose monetary policies are. Capital accumulation is economic
growth. And savings are the source of capital. But inflation can severely damage
capital accumulation, not just by creating distortions in the production structure
but by also eating away at savings.
Capital gains are profits. It is these profits that entrepreneurs plough back
into their businesses. Capital gains taxes are not indexed for inflation. This
means that the current rate of inflation has greatly increased the effective
tax rate on capital gains and hence capital accumulation. And what is the response
of the Democrats? A proposal that would inflict on Americans the biggest tax
hike in their history.
Bismarck is reported to have said: "God looks after fools, drunkards and the
United States of America". The world had better hope that he got it right.
*Heilperin disputed the theory that exchange rates are ultimately
determined by relative purchasing power. (Michael A. Heilperin, International
Monetary Economics, Longmans, Green and Company, 1939, ch. VII). However,
I believe that Wu successfully dealt with the problem of relative purchasing
power and the price level. (Chi-Yuen Wu, An Outline of International Price
Theories, George Routledge & Sons LTD, 1939, pp. 250-254).
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