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An Occasional Letter From The Collection Agency
This Letter is a follow on from my article The
Future Actions of The Federal Reserve and US Govt are known in which,
using the work of GB Eggertsson, we showed that the Fed/US Govt is following
a plan to stimulate the economy and avoid a deflationary episode. Essentially
the plan is to avoid the mistakes of the Depression and those of Japan in
the 90's by using increased Government debt, monetized by the Fed, targeted
directly at consumers. By employing a credible threat of an inflationary
stance the Fed/US Govt hope to raise inflation expectations and therefore
raise the price of assets.
Whilst the groundwork for such actions are already in place as discussed previously,
I now wish to concentrate on the effects such actions will have in the future.
Again, I have to write this article without recourse to my own thoughts to
keep an objective viewpoint. I will be using GB Eggertsson again as a reference
point. Although it would appear to narrow the perspective the fact that his
Theory is in play and he is a member of the New York Fed staff would lend weight
to his other work in this regard. In December 2005 Eggertsson published a paper
entitled "Great
Expectations and the End of the Depression" in which he laid out how the
policies of President FD Roosevelt allowed the economy to depart from a deflationary
environment.
What I want to show is that Eggertsson has based his theory on the successful
polices and methods employed by FDR and what effect those policies had on the
economy. Within the paper Eggertsson lays out arguments that support the FDR
policies as the only credible approach to economic stimulus during a period
of deflation. I believe that those policies are now being used to circumvent
the current threat of a deflationary period caused by the credit crash.
Before we begin, I would like to show you a quote from the time as FDR enacted
his policy change, referred to as a "regime change" (Sargent 1983 and Temin & Wigmore
1990):
"It is hard to overstate how radical the regime change was. "This is the
end of Western civilization," declared Lewis Douglas, Director of the Budget,
for example.(2) During FDR's first year in office several senior government
officials resigned in protest.(3)"
(2)Cited in Davis (1986), p. 107. (3)These included Lewis Douglas. The acting
Secretary of the Treasury, Dean Acheson, was forced to resign due to his
oppisition to unbalanced budgets and the abolishment of the gold standard.
Clearly it was not the end of western civilisation at that time. What we do
see is the turmoil that was created by adoption of the new regime. Such events
could be compared to the arguments put forward by the recently retired US Comptroller
General David
M Walker.
History
Without going too deep into history we need to compare the performance of
the overall economy during the FDR presidency with the previous 4 year period.
Within the following quote from Eggertsson is an interesting observation about
the growth of the monetary base:
"The effect of the FDR regime shift is clearly evident in the data. When
FDR was inaugurated in March 1933 excessive deflation turned into modest
inflation. There was little change in the trend growth of the monetary base
around this turning point. Money growth did not start on a sustained upward
trend until several months after prices started to rise. Similarly, the fiscal
expansion happened with a substantial lag.
This evidence suggests that the recovery was driven almost exclusively by
expectations about future policy. The comparison between FDR's first term
in office (1933-37) and President Herbert Hoover's last (1929-33) is striking.
Hoover's last term resulted in 26 percent deflation, while FDR's first registered
13 percent inflation. Similarly, output declined by 30 percent from 1929-1933.
This was the worst depression in US history. In contrast, 1933-1937 registered
the strongest output growth (39 percent) of any four year period in the US
history outside of war."
As can be seen in the following table (Eggertsson) 1933 marked the end of
the contraction in GDP in dollar terms and the beginning of a large scale expansion
of public debt. Noticeable is the acceleration in the growth of the
monetary base that begins in 1934, lagging the increase in public debt:

This would support the argument that the increase in debt raised inflation
expectations, leading to an increase in monetary demand.
Form this we can infer, without reference to historical writings, that FDR
was seen as credible in his regime change. it was this credible approach that
allowed inflation expectations to be seen as correct and for monetary requirements
to change accordingly.
The Effects
As FDR took office, there was a noticeable turnaround in expectations. Firstly,
lets see what the baseline was, according to Eggertsson:
"The reason for the collapse is that the central bank cannot lower interest
rates enough to accommodate deflationary shocks, due to the zero bound on
interest rates and is unable to change expectations about future policy.
This creates a strong deflation bias. The deflation bias helps explain the
severity of the Great Depression, because real interest rates were excessively
high in 1929-33 due to double digit deflation. This choked spending, especially
investment. "Money was king" during this period. Nobody was interested in
investing when the returns from stuffing money under the mattress were 10-15
percent in real terms. People gained more, in other words, from holding money
than spending it."
Or as I said, why spend today when it will be cheaper tomorrow? It is clear
that to make the Eggertsson Theory work, the baseline conditions of the economy
should be depressed before allowing the already prepared stimulus to be released.
Compare the conditions in 1933 to those today:
The short-term nominal interest rate was close to zero during the Great
Depression. The yield on three month Treasuries, for example, was only 0.05
percent in January 1933. Further interest rate reductions were clearly not
feasible. Open market operations, in themselves, had no effect, since money
and government bonds were perfect substitutes. This explains why several
observers at the time were skeptical of the effectiveness of monetary policy
and believed that open market operations were just like "pushing on a string".
Despite this, however, monetary policy was far from powerless. While increasing
the money supply at zero interest rate has no effect, expectations about
higher future money supply (once deflationary pressures have subsided and
interest rates are positive again) have large effects because they change
people's expectations about the future price level, thus reducing real interest
rates. What was needed to end the Depression was a regime shift that changed
expectations about future policy in a credible way. This is precisely what
FDR achieved.
With current 3 month yields at at 1.13% and inflation measures well above,
it can be seen why the Fed/US Govt fear a deflationary scenario. The requirement
for a credible policy that will result in rising inflation expectations is
absolute, to ensure that neither the consumer or business is discouraged from
spending or investing. (This has far-reaching consequences, for instance it
would not be in the Fed interest to suppress the price of gold)
With this in mind, let us look at some of the effects that FDR policy regime
change had post 1933:
Price Levels

Investment

Commodity Prices

Stocks

Again, it is clear to see that the expectations of rising inflation based
on a credible policy had an almost instant effect on assets and prices before fiscal
and monetary policy had time to make their actual changes felt.
Comparisons to Today
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