"Financial Leverage May Boost Global Economic Growth"
- Bloomberg, June 4
"For Troubled Firms, A Flood of Big Loans"
- Wall Street Journal, June 12
The front page article included a chart titled "Mound of Debt" that
showed the exponential growth of the face value of leveraged loans. These are
defined as speculative-grade loans and unrated loans at interest rates of 1.25
points or more above Libor.
From almost nothing in 1996 the "mound" has soared from $240 billion
in 2005, $400 billion outstanding at the end of 2006, to $480 billion as of
May 31.
"On Friday afternoon amid investor demands to get their cash back
and concerns that the fund wouldn't be able to make margin calls - or requests
from creditors for additional cash or collateral - lender Merrill Lynch
announced plans to seize $400 million in collateral from the fund."
- Wall Street Journal, June 18
The fund is run by Bear Sterns and is called High Grade Structured Credit
Strategies Enhanced Leveraged Fund. By our simple reckoning this comes out
as financial engineering or as celebrated by Tokyo in 1989 "Zaitech".
This reminds of the old observation that in a contraction it can be difficult,
if not impossible, even for AAA ratings to obtain loans, while in a boom it's
impossible for any credit to refuse a loan.
The latter seems to be the case now and it seems likely that the lenders are
carrying the loans on their books at par.
It's worth reviewing lending conditions. As the great bear market in bonds
(1946 to 1981) was becoming rather distressed the market for treasuries was
a disaster, the corporate market was worse, and there was virtually no such
thing as a "Sovereign Market".
Notwithstanding this, the big banking syndicates out of New York continued
to make loans to a variety of "Sovereign" borrowers and despite
the unique turmoil in the credit markets, were insisting that the loans would
be kept on the books at par. The thinking was that because countries always
met their obligations their loans would always be worth par.
This delusion went on longer than it should have when a small bank away down
the selling group decided in all honesty that it was going to mark its position
to market.
The big banks insisted that this need not, nor should not, be done. The small
bank, which was located outside New York, must have been managed by bankers,
rather than economists, because common sense prevailed and the big banks were
forced to mark their portfolios of doubtful paper to market.
As Wall Street Journal observes, there are mounds of doubtful paper out there.
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