The Fed's creation of various facilities in recent months - the Term Auction
Facility (TAF) for depository institutions, the Term Securities Lending Facility
(TSLF) for primary government securities dealers and the Primary Dealers Credit
Facility (PDCF) - would be expected to alleviate some institutional liquidity
issues that otherwise could metastasize into institutional solvency issues.
Commercial and investment banks now can borrow against seemingly credit-worthy
collateral with a much smaller "haircut" than otherwise. The Fed has created
these new liquidity facilities in order to forestall a systemic failure of
the financial system, not to enhance financial institution shareholder value.
A byproduct of the new Fed liquidity facilities, however, undoubtedly has
been to enhance financial institutions' shareholder value - perhaps save for
one. By the Fed taking onto its balance sheet less creditworthy collateral
as result of these new facilities, U.S. taxpayers have increased contingent
liabilities. (The Fed turns over to the Treasury each year the bulk of its
profits. If the Fed were to sustain losses on its collateral, the amount of
profits it turned over to the Treasury would be reduced.) Why should the current
shareholders of financial institutions benefit at the expense of U.S. taxpayers
in general?
In a case where man bites dog, it appears as though the Fed and the Treasury
may be looking out for the interests of the U.S. taxpayer. Publicly, both Fed
and Treasury officials have urged financial institutions to raise additional
capital post haste. I am not privy to private conversations, but I would
hope Fed and Treasury officials are directly communicating to the CEOs of large
financial institutions with "skinny" capital positions that they will raise
more capital. By raising more capital, the contingent liabilities of U.S. taxpayers
will be reduced and the existing shareholders of these large financial institutions
will bear some of the social costs of these new Fed facilities through a dilution
of their ownership in the financial institutions.
Paul L. Kasriel
Director of Economic Research The Northern Trust Company Economic Research Department
Positive Economic Commentary
"The economics of what is, rather than what you might like it to be."
50 South LaSalle Street, Chicago, Illinois 60675
Paul joined the economic research unit of The Northern Trust Company in 1986
as Vice President and Economist, being named Senior Vice President and Director
of Economic Research in 2000. His economic and interest rate forecasts are
used both internally and by clients. The accuracy of the Economic Research
Department's forecasts has consistently been highly-ranked in the Blue Chip
survey of about 50 forecasters over the years. To that point, Paul received
the prestigious 2006 Lawrence R. Klein Award for having the most accurate economic
forecast among the Blue Chip survey participants for the years 2002 through
2005. The accuracy of Paul's 2008 economic forecast was ranked in the top five
of The Wall Street Journal survey panel of economists. In January 2009, The
Wall Street Journal and Forbes cited Paul as one of the few who identified
early on the formation of the housing bubble and foresaw the economic and financial
market havoc that would ensue after the bubble inevitably burst. Through written
commentaries containing his straightforward and often nonconsensus analysis
of economic and financial market issues, Paul has developed a loyal following
in the financial community. The Northern's economic website was listed as one
of the top ten most interesting by The Wall Street Journal. Paul is the co-author
of a book entitled Seven Indicators That Move Markets.
Paul began his career as a research economist at the Federal Reserve Bank
of Chicago. He has taught courses in finance at the DePaul University Kellstadt
Graduate School of Business and at the Northwestern University Kellogg Graduate
School of Management. Paul serves on the Economic Advisory Committee of the
American Bankers Association.
The opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily
represent the views of The Northern Trust Company. The information herein is
based on sources which The Northern Trust Company believes to be reliable,
but we cannot warrant its accuracy or completeness. Such information is subject
to change and is not intended to influence your investment decisions.