Gold: The Nationalization of Wall Street

By: John Ing | Thu, Mar 27, 2008
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Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke once said: "By increasing the number of U.S. dollars in circulation, or even by credibly threatening to do so, the U.S. government can also reduce the value of a dollar in terms of goods and services, which is equivalent to raising the prices in dollars of those goods and services. We conclude that, under a paper money system, a determined government can always generate higher spending and hence positive inflation."

The Fed slashed short-term interest rates six times in six months to 2.25 per cent from 5.25 per cent despite the U.S. Department of Labor reporting that consumer prices had jumped 4.3 per cent at an annual rate in January - the biggest rise in two years. As a result, the Fed's benchmark overnight lending rate is about half the rate of inflation and real interest rates are now negative. The last time interest rates were negative, housing exploded; the housing bubble grew larger stoked by Wall Street's alchemy of mortgage backed securities that are at the heart of the unfolding crisis.

Bernanke, a student of the Great Depression, believes that policymakers and politicians then were too slow in countering the downturn, letting the resulting panic sink the economy. Bernanke is right about the foot-dragging almost eight decades ago. But by slashing interest rates and lending hundreds of billions to Wall Street today, he risks creating yet another bubble. Already, Bernanke has orchestrated the biggest bailout since the Great Depression in the wake of the collapse of the mortgage industry. Even oil, gold and other commodities retreated rapidly from record highs as traders flattened positions in a desperate deleveraging process. The greatest fear is the fear of the unknown. The current financial crisis is due to the lack of confidence and trust because of uncertainty about the extent and breadth of the potential financial losses.

Counterparty Defaults?

The credit market simply lacks credit. The subprime woes have spilled over into dislocations in the overall credit markets - from municipal debt, to corporate debt, to derivatives. Fears of a default by a counterparty is threatening the global financial system and is believed to be one of the reasons behind JP Morgan Chase's bid for Bear Stearns. Banks are hoarding and have stopped lending since their thin capital base (and solvency) is at risk while their customers such as hedge funds, private equity and Corporate America are forced to deleverage and dump the assets - like those owned by Bear Stearns - in a no bid market. Lower rates will not unblock this logjam. Unfortunately, lower interest rates are not the answer in warding off this financial market crisis. The source of America's problems is not interest rates. The problem is simply too much debt and too much leverage. A great unwinding is the answer.

Despite the dramatic drop in rates, there are still no signs of a pick-up in the credit markets. Trust has evaporated. Banks are desperately trying to dump billions of leveraged securities in an illiquid market. To date Wall Street has taken only $200 billion of writedowns but has only raised about $100 billion, leaving a shortfall. The Fed has extended loans to the investment banks, taking on some of their illiquid paper as collateral. After failing to offload these to a naïve public, the game of "slicing and dicing" risk and dispersing this risk is over. Now, that risk has come back to haunt them. And any sale becomes a new benchmark for these dubious assets, leading to more price cuts and, of course, further fire sales and bigger losses. The markets have yet to reprice risk.

The Tip of the Iceberg

In the credit binge, the risk-rating agencies became more like principals rather than advisors and helped spread the poor quality of debt by rating risk highly. Today, AAA ratings mean nothing. With the closing of America's capital market, the big Wall Street icons such as Citicorp, Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley were forced to rebuild their balance sheets with the help of foreign buyers such as foreign sovereign wealth funds from Singapore to Kuwait. America's growing reliance on foreigners for funding its deficits has become its Achilles heel. Already there is a controversy over the growth of sovereign wealth funds (SWF), which manage between $2.5 trillion and $3 trillion, and to date more than $100 billion has bailed out Wall Street's biggest investment banks. But the United States can't accept this money without conditions. In the past, the Asian or Middle Eastern buyers bought trophy buildings, recycling their excess dollars back into the United States. As of last summer, foreigners owned $ 6 trillion or 66 per cent of the entire $9 trillion U.S. federal debt load.

In order to keep their currencies competitive, the Asian central banks and the petro powers of the Middle East ploughed their reserves into U.S. treasuries. This is great while it lasts, but as Asia booms and Wall Street declines, the big buyers of treasuries are growing disenchanted with some of their earlier purchases. No one likes to lose money and the Fed must somehow maintain the trust of foreigners. China's near-Bear experience and the promise of more taxpayer-assisted bailouts will certainly cause foreigners to think twice about investing in the United States. Wall Street's problems seem to be chronic and the Chinese are looking at huge losses in their foray into Wall Street. It will get worse. We believe there will be less Asian money available to finance America's trade deficits, which requires over $2 billion a day of outside funds.

Wall Street's Margin Call

The party is over on Wall Street. Carlyle Capital Corp., the publicly traded investment fund affiliated with the powerful Carlyle Group, defaulted on $22 billion of mortgage securities on a flimsy capital base of less than $1 billion. That is 22 times leverage, exceeding the leverage of bankrupt Long Term Capital Management LLC. And venerable Bear Stearns was sold for about one third per cent of its value the previous week. With almost $100 billion of liabilities against book value of less than $12 billion, the investment bank was forced to close its doors at liquidation value. Bear Stearns was the key prime financer/broker for America's biggest hedge funds and its demise threatens a domino-like counterparty chain reaction that could spread throughout Wall Street.

Bear's key role in the web of financial players and counterparty risk emerged as a major reason for the Fed's bailout. Ironically, it was last summer's collapse of two Bear hedge funds that sparked the upheaval in the markets. Bear simply was hoist upon its own petard. Most troubling is that all investment banks are similarly highly leveraged. Bear Stearns borrowed $30 for every $1 of capital. Yet Morgan Stanley has leverage of 32 to 1, Merrill Lynch 28:1, Lehman Bros. 32:1 and Goldman Sachs 26:1. Worse still, not even the Sheriff of Wall Street is around to witness the unravelling.

That Wall Street cannot fund itself has forced its major players to borrow massive amounts of money from the Federal Reserve. The Fed has even taken to accepting dubious assets as collateral to alleviate the financial stress in the markets, which in essence makes the Fed "the garbage collector of last resort." The Fed created a growing $200 billion lifeline available to lend treasuries in exchange for unmarketable triple-A mortgage-backed securities. Bear Stearns was the first recipient of this largesse and already the Fed is on the hook for more than $30 billion of Bear's obligations that JP Morgan does not want. This is not a crisis in liquidity but one of solvency.

In our view, the Fed's solution is simply the beginning of the defacto nationalization of Wall Street. What's particularly worrisome is that the Fed has started on the slippery slope of taking on the credit risk and liabilities of Wall Street, similar to the Bank of England's bailout of Northern Rock, which ended in the nationalization of that sorry institution. The Bank of England's nationalization of Britain's largest mortgage company cost taxpayers more than $200 billion. The sobering message, however, is that it's far from over. Inevitably, politicians and regulators are pressured to prevent more problems, but there is no point in closing the barn door after the horse has left.

With the shadow of the thirties looming, the Fed's orchestration of events since August, from the decision to give Wall Street access to the discount window, to the acceptance of Wall Street's inventory as collateral, to the cronyism of the Plunge Protection Team (PPT) to the $30 billion backstop of unwanted securities to the Bear Stearns' rescue, to the relaxation of rules governing quasi-government bodies such as money losing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, all points to a role beyond that of a lender of last resort. In absorbing the liabilities of Wall Street, the Fed is simply piling on debt on more debt. No nation, even the United States, can borrow forever without facing up to economic consequences. And no one is too big to fail.

Just Who Will Bail Out The Fed?

The U.S. dollar is among the sickest currencies in the world, giving up 50 per cent of its value since 2002 because the United States is deep in the financial hole. The gap between spending and revenue grows ever wider. Today, foreigners are not so eager to help. The problem is that America is a debtor country and dependent on foreigners to finance its chronic deficits requiring an inflow of $800 billion from foreign investors each year to finance the country's deficits. Not surprisingly, America's creditors are losing confidence in the country's solvency. Americans spend too much and save too little. America's trade deficit is at seven per cent of GDP and the budgetary deficit - excluding supplement spending for the war - is estimated at $400 billion. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated the costs of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan so far at $600 billion and Congress is to approve another $275 billion. The CBO estimates the war might eventually cost between $1 trillion and $2 trillion by 2017. Meantime, consumer spending accounts for more than 70 per cent of the U.S. economy, but household debt is now at 140 per cent of consumers' after-tax income. Debt on debt is not good.

There is no question that the bursting of the housing bubble and the cost of the inevitable breakdown of the financial system has created huge dangers for the global financial system. The vortex already has dragged down institutions in the United Kingdom, Switzerland and New York. The United States is on a path similar to Japan's deflation in 1990s. While the savings and loan bailout cost U.S. taxpayers "only" $200 billion, this time the potential cost of the biggest bailout in history is estimated at more than $1.2 trillion or enough to wipe out half of the global banking sector's capital. We believe that fears that U.S. taxpayers face even bigger bailouts to save Wall Street will further undermine confidence in the dollar, boosting gold's allure. Gold is a good thing to have as a barometer of investor anxiety.

Previous crises such as the stock market meltdown in October 1987, the S&L crisis in the early the 90s and the Asian contagion in 1997 or the bursting of the tech bubble in 2000 had a common denominator - too much money chasing too few markets. Warren Buffett warned that derivatives today are the new ticking time bomb. Derivatives exploded to a whopping $516 trillion by 2007, according to the Bank of International Settlements. Yet it is not the size of the market that concerns us. It is the growing risk of counterparty failure since the capital position of the global banking system supporting the $500 trillion plus of derivatives is estimated at only $2 trillion, insufficient to handle even one per cent of potential losses.

Stagflation Now?

In January, U.S. farm prices had an annualized 7.4 percent increase, the biggest yearly gain in more than 26 years. Beset by credit woes, the U.S. economy appears to be entering a period of low growth and high inflation, just like the stagflation of the 1970s. Rising food and energy prices are sopping up what's left of consumers' discretionary income. The bad news is that central banks appear to be providing the very fuel that will stoke inflation even further. The Fed's dramatic lowering of interest rates has not helped domestic demand. Instead, it has simply sped up the flood of capital away from the United States. There is tight productive capacity from potash to steel to coal while the only surplus seems to be in cars and condos. Of concern is that the rise in commodity prices is not cyclical but structural, with huge supply shortages.

Inflation is the monetary flavour of the week and the month. Inflation is rising, pushed upwards by high oil, food and commodity prices. Short-term government yields are at lows only because of the Fed's panic to prop up Wall Street and long rates are actually rising. More important, inflation is on the rise in France, Japan and Saudi Arabia. Meantime, in China it is at the highest level in a decade.

The Fed is worried more about the risk of a financial meltdown than rising inflation. This time, central banks have not only flooded the system with money but also loosened financial regulations for highly leveraged mortgage giants Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. Prices, of course, are rising because there is too much money being created. The root cause of inflation is money creation. Sadly, for the central banks and the financial markets, inflation is the obvious solution to U.S. indebtedness, allowing money to depreciate even faster. For creditors, this is not a solution.

The potent combination of a slowdown, the cost of Wall Street's bailouts and skyrocketing commodities has investors justifiably worried about a repeat of 1970s stagflation. In the '70s, two oil embargos doubled the price of oil to $50 a barrel. The oil shocks were accompanied by a surge in "soft" commodities after the anchovy fishery off the coast of Peru almost disappeared. The need to replace the anchovies caused the Japanese to switch to soybeans, which caused a spike in prices. Indeed, the jump in commodities crippled the global economy. Costs went up and wages were raised to compensate for increased prices in a classic case of cost-push inflation. In 1980, the U.S. inflation rate reached 13 per cent and wage and price controls were imposed when inflation hit 4 percent, the identical level today. Gold rose from $35 an ounce to more than $850. Interest rates soared to double digits when the government realized that it had to fight inflation, Fed Chairman Paul Volcker arrived on the scene, eventually snuffing out inflation by sending interest rates to the sky, which ended in a decade of stagflation.

Today, we have similar ingredients in place, now only monetary policy is much easier. The parallels are most ominous. Recently, M2 money supply increased a whopping $35 billion a week as the Fed provided both expansive monetary and fiscal stimulus. With inflation picking up, investors should know that the current monetary inflation is not just an increase in the monetary base. It is the leverage impact of this monetary inflation, which creates bubbles. As in the 1970s, food prices have now risen by more than 75 percent from the lows of 2000. Meantime, China's growth and poor weather has intensified demand, cutting into supplies at the same time. Ironically, the spike in the oil price has encouraged the conversion of grain to bio-fuels, helping to trigger a dramatic increase in food prices. This is controversial because Americans are actually subsidizing crops for fuel instead of for food; making it seem more important to drive an SUV in the United States than it is to eat.

Moreover, the news could be even worse than we think because the government's inflation statistics are skewed. For example, the "core" inflation rate excludes energy and food prices because of a desire to "even out" spikes. Thus, we are told inflation rose only 2.7 per cent on an annualized basis in February. The elimination of food and energy has relegated inflation to the back pages, making historic rate comparisons meaningless. The bottom line, however, is that energy and food prices are increasing and the core rate is on the move. The CPI rate is actually 4.3 per cent, the same level that spurred wage and price controls on Aug. 15, 1971.

When The Swamp Drains, The Ugly Frogs Are Exposed

For us, there is a sense of déjà vu because the Bernanke reflation is similar to Alan Greenspan keeping interest rates too low for too long causing the housing bubble and, ultimately, the credit bubble. Now both have burst and we have Bernanke pumping yet again. To avoid a systemic banking crisis, the Fed has opened the monetary flood gates. Investors are concerned about credit conditions. If Wall Street firms continue to lose money at current rates, they will find themselves below capital requirements in less than six months. Bernanke and Wall Street appear to think that the solution is to reduce interest rates. And yet by relaxing borrowing requirements, they are in fact leveraging the system even more. America's solution is to devalue its currency further and monetize this mountain of debt by inflating its way out of the problems, just as it did in the 1970s. And the emphasis on more bailouts has prompted investors to seek refuge in "hard assets" such as gold and oil as a hedge against future inflation and currency depreciation. That is why gold hit $1,000 an ounce.

The U.S. dollar has fallen to a new low against the euro while gold recorded new highs. Further rate cuts by the Fed have the effect "pushing on a string" and to date has not ended the downward spiral in housing. The Fed has cut rates by 300 basis points but long-term yields have actually gone up, not down, further reflecting investors' concern that inflation is the next big problem. Mortgage rates have actually gone up. After the subprime mess came the CDO mess. Then the investment banks fell and now the hedge funds are falling. All are subject to capital constraints, and in the deleveraging process, Wall es are surfacing just as a Street's inadequaci draining swamp exposes its ugliest frogs.

The Bottom Line?

We believe the piling on of more debt to rescue the financial system and the U.S. economy is unlikely to work in the face of a surge in inflation. Nor will driving interest rates to the floor work since it will debase the dollar further. Americans have become too dependent on foreigners, who have become increasingly uncomfortable with their enormous dollar holdings.

Reflation has created a new commodity bubble. The other driver is the emergence of China and India, coupled with supply constraints caused by sustained underinvestment. The aging infrastructure of the commodities producers has not kept pace with the new demand. Thus, there is a need for the market to return to balance. Unfortunately, greater money supply will neither cause a fall in demand nor significant increases in supply, so prices are expected to remain at elevated levels for some time to come. In mining, for example, it will take at least five years before any new discoveries come on stream. In addition, power shortages in South Africa have led the mining industry to both curtail expansion and current production. Consequently, there will continue to be waves of consolidation as the bigger mining companies look to economies of scale. Gold is a good commodity to own.

What Do We Need?

Needed is the recapitalization and restructuring of Wall Street, which is bloated from a decade of financial innovation. Needed is the repricing of risk. Needed is a new way for the rating agencies to rate risk, in that they cannot be principals but truly arms-length advisors. Needed is a restoration of faith in the U.S. dollar, which requires a fundamental change of policy in the current and next U.S. administrations. Needed is a boost in the U.S. savings rate, which now sits at zero. Needed is a reduction in the twin U.S. deficits. Needed is more candour from officials and policymakers. Needed is a deleveraging process.

Needed is for the Fed to allow the investment banks to take their losses, support those in need of liquidity, but not assume those losses. While prices will undoubtedly go lower, investors are really looking at a repricing of risk. The markdowns are needed as a discipline. Needed is a change in the accounting rules to reflect mark-to-market losses and the impact on the investment banks' capital. Needed is a reversal of the accounting rules that allowed the banks to leverage up and instead put an emphasis on capital building rather than leverage. Needed are the changes in the impact of securitization that converted illiquid debt into new instruments. Needed is a change in accounting rules for off-balance sheet vehicles.

The United States must also address its continuing problem of too much consumption and its reliance on debt. America's credit woes come at a time when the rest of world is no longer willing to finance its current account deficits. After a quarter century of wealth creation, Americans have no choice but to work harder, tighten their belts, retire later and save more.

The economic downturn has paved the way for a new sheriff in town. Among the Democrats, one of them is an inspiring orator but both offer no solutions other than hope. Both want a government to spend more, abrogate trade agreements, bail out its institutions and use more government intervention. For a time, Americans enjoyed a free ride on the stock market and housing market. Now they need a leader to solve the country's problems in new ways, not old ones.

And Finally, Needed Is a Role For Gold

Gold cannot be created like fiat currencies or be printed like dollars. At one time, the pound sterling was the world's reserve currency. It, too, failed. The monetary order is changing again and the dollar as a reserve currency is losing value and influence. In our view, a basket based on gold's value will go a long way to restore needed liquidity in the markets. Gold is simply the new old currency. Gold hit $1,000 an ounce because the world has been losing confidence in the dollars issued by the Fed.

Gold reached new highs amid tight supply/demand fundamentals, U.S. dollar weakness, investment buying and, equally important, the lack of faith in dollar assets. Gold has doubled in euro and yen terms since 2005. Investor demand is at a record, led by China, which has consumed more gold than India and United States combined. Meantime, supplies have been constrained as South Africa, the second largest producer, has curtailed its production due to a lack of power. China holds only about 600 tons or less than one per cent of its total reserves in gold. With reserves of $1.7 trillion, China will inevitably diversify part of those holdings into gold.

But most important, gold is a global currency that will become the "go to" asset class as the foundation for the global currency system falters due to the protracted credit crisis. Gold will go higher as long as America's solution to its debt crisis is to pile more debt upon debt, further debasing the dollar. America will, in effect, default on its obligations, either through currency debasement or inflation. Gold has no counterparty risk and no risk of default. This bull market has just begun. We see gold more than doubling to $2,500 an ounce. Gold is the ultimate "currency" and the inevitable store of value and medium of exchange. When George W. Bush was sworn in as president, gold was at $265 an ounce. This month, gold traded at $1,030 an ounce. In essence, the U.S. dollar has been devalued by more than 100 per cent in almost eight years of his presidency. Will the next president do any better?


Gold stocks finally caught up with bullion, performing in line and led by the more liquid big caps or senior producers both on the upside and downside. Gold's correction in the rush to liquidity presents an ideal purchase opportunity. We continue to believe the fundamentals are in place for higher prices. Joe Ismail, our learned technician, is calling for a period of near-term consolidation, but the secular uptrend remains intact. We continue to recommend companies with rising production and reserve growth profiles and the best opportunities lie in the mid-cap producers such as Agnico-Eagle and Kinross and the smaller producers such as Eldorado, Aurizon and Etruscan. IAMGold and Goldcorp are sources of funds.

We remain positive on gold and forecast the metal will move to $1,200 an ounce in the near term based on a combination of positive gold market fundamentals such as increased demand, reduced supplies and strong investment demand. While some hedge funds may have been forced out in the recent shake out, strong investment demand, particularly from the Far East, will push gold and the stocks higher.

Agnico-Eagle Mines Ltd.
Agnico has an enviable rising production growth and reserve profile, with five mines in development. Production will grow from 230,000 ounces last year to over 1.4 million ounces by 2011 at a total cash cost of $200 an ounce. Agnico has a strong balance sheet and cash flows enable it to complete its pipeline of new mines bringing on two mines this year. We particularly like the potential for reserve additions from Piños Altos and Meadowbank. Buy.

Barrick Gold Corp.
Barrick's results surprised the Street due to its strong earnings performance. However, Barrick's reserves rose by only 1.5 million ounces, which was not enough to offset its eight million ounces of gold production this year. Barrick purchased the remaining 40 percent interest in the Cortez project in Nevada from Rio Tinto, for almost $1.7 billion, which will consolidate this promising mine at a cost of $375 per ounce of reserves. Barrick is still not certain of bringing into production the big Pascua-Lama, against which it has 9.5 million ounces of hedges allocated and with a negative mark-to-market of $5.1 billion. We believe that Barrick needs this project. But given the tough technical and economic parameters, the huge hedge position makes this project difficult. Barrick's production profile is flat over the next few years and its projects are becoming bigger and bigger. For example, Pueblo Viejo's pricetag is estimated at $2.7 billion and Pascua-Lama is estimated at more than $3 billion. Barrick remains the premier "go to" producer and largest mining company in the gold sector. However, the flat production profile and multibillion dollar price tags for many of its development projects mean that it will be on the prowl again. The shares fell almost nine per cent in a single day, suggesting Barrick could be a good nearterm trade.

Eldorado Gold Corp.
While Eldorado received a disappointing non-decision from the High Court in Turkey, the company was allowed to restart its 100 percent-owned Kisladag mine. We expect the mine to be in full production this summer and it is business as usual. Meantime, Eldorado's case was returned to the Lower Court and the case will be reheard again. We do not expect this to cause any problems and we continue to rate Eldorado as a buy for Kisladag and Tanjianshan in China. The company received some good news from a Nova mine, its Brazilian Vil as a possible iron ore expansion with BHP.

Goldcorp Inc.
Goldcorp reported decent results due to the crown jewel Red Lake Mine. The company forecast gold production at 2.6 million ounces this year, with Los Filos contributing. On the negative side, the price tag for Peñasquito keeps increasing despite an expected contribution from the heap leach circuit. Goldcorp has more than 10 mines based in the Americas but the development risk at Peñasquito and El Sauzal suggests that Goldcorp could disappoint. Goldcorp recently sold its entire stake in Silver Wheaton for almost $1.6 billion because of its need for capital for its projects like Pueblo Viejo and the growing price tag at Peñasquito.

High River Gold Mines Ltd.
High River will produce 175,000 ounces this year - up from 130,000 ounces last year - with production from Taparko and Berezitovy in Russia. The company has two advanced projects in Bissa in Burkina Fasa and Prognoz in Russia, which is a high-grade silver project. High River added reserves and Berezitovy is producing gold at 100,000 ounce per year pace. The company plans to extract zinc-lead-silver, taking advantage of higher metal prices. At Bissa, the company has outlined more than 1.5 million ounces and has 12 major target areas identified for drilling. The big upside, however, is the huge Prognoz silver project, which is a high-grade deposit with more than 70 million ounces of silver. The company has been drilling and a NI 43-101 is projected, although the company has outlined only a small fraction of its many multiple veins. We like High River's array of exploration projects and continue to recommend the shares at current levels.

IAMGold Corp.
IAMGold reported that the French government has not approved permits for its French Guiana Camp Caimen deposit. The announcement was a surprise given that the country needs a contribution from this mine. Camp Caimen was supposed to produce 125,000 ounces a year, starting in 2010. Without Camp Caimen, IAMGold's production profile will be flat because its eight mines, including Doyon and Rosebel, are mature. More significant is the possibility that Camp Caimen's reserves will be deducted and a writedown is necessary. We would avoid IAMGold in the near term because its mines are in a mature mode with rising costs and Camp Caimen is in limbo.

Kinross Gold Corp.
Kinross reported excellent results for the year and expects production of two million ounces growing to 2.6 million ounces next year as the high-grade Kupol mine in Russia makes a contribution. Kinross has been expanding at Paracutu in Brazil and the completion of the high-grade Kupol mine in Chukotka will ensure a rising production profile. Unlike the seniors, Kinross added to reserves this year. Buy.

Newmont Mining Corp.
Big cap Newmont's results were disappointing as costs increased. Newmont's reserves actually fell 7.4 million ounces on a year-over-year basis, making new president O'Brien's task all the more difficult given that Newmont produced only 5.4 million ounces this year. In addition, Newmont has had problems at its Indonesian Batu Hijau operations with respect to divestiture of a local interest, but the operations deteriorated due to lower grades. In addition, Newmont's troubled Phoenix operation in Nevada continues to disappoint. While Newmont is more focused, the company's divestiture of Franco Nevada removed a source of future mines and profitability. Over the near term and despite the large land holdings, we think that Newmont is dead money. Moreover, the company's mines faced large cost increases, reducing margins.

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Analyst Disclosure
Company Name Trading Symbol *Exchange Disclosure code
Barrick Gold ABX T 1
Eldorado ELD T 1
Kinross K T 1
Disclosure Key: 1=The Analyst, Associate or member of their household owns the securities of the subject issuer. 2=Maison Placements Canada Inc. and/or affiliated companies beneficially own more than 1% of any class of common equity of the issuers. 3=<Employee name> who is an officer or director of Maison Placements Canada Inc. or it's affiliated companies serves as a director or advisory Board Member of the issuer. 4=In the previous 12 months a Maison Analyst received compensation from the subject company. 5=Maison Placements Canada Inc. has managed co-managed or participated in an offering of securities by the issuer in the past 12 months. 6=Maison Placements Canada Inc. has received compensation for investment banking and related services from the issuer in the past 12 months. 7=Maison is making a market in an equity or equity related security of the subject issuer. 8=The analyst has recently paid a visit to review the material operations of the issuer. 9=The analyst has received payment or reimbursement from the issuer regarding a recent visit. T-Toronto; V-TSX Venture; NQ-NASDAQ; NY-New York Stock Exchange



John Ing

Author: John Ing

John R. Ing
Maison Placements Canada
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