Yesterday I expressed my opinion on the lack of economic substance of allowing
financial institutions to value the assets on their books at historical cost
or whatever they so desire (Mark
It as You Choose, but Is Enough Cash Coming In?). Today, yet another "costless" solution
to the bad-asset problem is being put forth in the Financial Times -
quarantine the bad apples from the good (Wall
St banks seek to ring-fence bad assets). Simply isolating the bad assets
does not make them "good." Selling the isolated bad assets in an arms-length
transaction to some other private entity presumably results in a loss for the
seller. If not, why are they considered bad assets? Selling the isolated bad
assets to some government entity at some price above an arms-length transaction
shifts the loss from the selling institution to the taxpayers. When will the
modern-day alchemists face up to the fact that they have lead, not gold, on
their balance sheets, take their losses and move on?
Jobless Claims - If One Week Does Not a Trend Make, How about 4 Weeks?
Initial jobless claims soared upward by 38 thousand in the week ended March
29. Maybe the moveable feast of Easter played havoc with the seasonal adjustment
factor. Maybe a strike in the auto-equipment sector biased upward new unemployment
claims. So, lets look at 4-week moving averages of not-seasonally-adjusted
initial claims and compare them with year-ago data. Chart 1 shows that the
year-over-year rate of increase in initial jobless claims is picking up speed
- hitting 19.5% in the four weeks ended March 29. Obviously, the latest observation
is affected by the surge in the latest one-week tally. But if we rewind the
tape a little, we still see double digit year-over-year percentage increases
in the 4 weeks ended March 15 (13.13%) and March 22 (14.35%). A similar rising
pattern has been established for continuing unemployment claims (see Chart
2). Chart 3 shows that the unemployment rate among those covered by out-of-work
insurance has stair-stepped its way up from 1.9% to 2.2%. In the words of Alfred
Kahn, President Carter's Council of Economic Advisers chairman - the economy
has entered a "banana."
Paul L. Kasriel
Director of Economic Research The Northern Trust Company Economic Research Department
Positive Economic Commentary
"The economics of what is, rather than what you might like it to be."
50 South LaSalle Street, Chicago, Illinois 60675
Paul joined the economic research unit of The Northern Trust Company in 1986
as Vice President and Economist, being named Senior Vice President and Director
of Economic Research in 2000. His economic and interest rate forecasts are
used both internally and by clients. The accuracy of the Economic Research
Department's forecasts has consistently been highly-ranked in the Blue Chip
survey of about 50 forecasters over the years. To that point, Paul received
the prestigious 2006 Lawrence R. Klein Award for having the most accurate economic
forecast among the Blue Chip survey participants for the years 2002 through
2005. The accuracy of Paul's 2008 economic forecast was ranked in the top five
of The Wall Street Journal survey panel of economists. In January 2009, The
Wall Street Journal and Forbes cited Paul as one of the few who identified
early on the formation of the housing bubble and foresaw the economic and financial
market havoc that would ensue after the bubble inevitably burst. Through written
commentaries containing his straightforward and often nonconsensus analysis
of economic and financial market issues, Paul has developed a loyal following
in the financial community. The Northern's economic website was listed as one
of the top ten most interesting by The Wall Street Journal. Paul is the co-author
of a book entitled Seven Indicators That Move Markets.
Paul began his career as a research economist at the Federal Reserve Bank
of Chicago. He has taught courses in finance at the DePaul University Kellstadt
Graduate School of Business and at the Northwestern University Kellogg Graduate
School of Management. Paul serves on the Economic Advisory Committee of the
American Bankers Association.
The opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily
represent the views of The Northern Trust Company. The information herein is
based on sources which The Northern Trust Company believes to be reliable,
but we cannot warrant its accuracy or completeness. Such information is subject
to change and is not intended to influence your investment decisions.