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Abstract
This paper shows that classical business cycles can be integrated
with stock-market cycles in an effective forecasting model. The
Stock-Market and Economic Cycles Template (SMECT) demonstrates
that these cycles are linked in a binary harmonic sequencing
that is primarily trough-synchronized. Bronson’s BAAC Supercycle
provides the crucial missing link in this series of nested cycles,
as well as distinguishes periods of significantly higher and
lower economic growth and stock market performance. SMECT shows
that the interrelationships between these cycles have continued
to become stronger, especially during the Modern Policymaking
Era 1 . SMECT provides more refined
timing for the more frequent and/or more severe bear stock markets,
as well as the recessions they anticipate, that we are forecasting
for the current Supercycle bear market period. Finally, SMECT
illustrates the applicability of Bronson’s Growth Cycle
to business and stock-market cycles.
Introduction
Since there is an obvious interrelationship between short-term
business cycles and short-term stock-market cycles, it is useful
to discover their common elements in order to develop a theory
that explains the underlying connections between them and, in
our case, to form meaningful, differentiating forecasts, especially
over longer-term horizons. By pulling back from the close-up
differences and viewing the cycles from a longer-term perspective,
their commonalities become more apparent - analogous to the Heisenberg
Uncertainty principle, but for different feedback reasons.
It is a well-recognized fact that the stock market, as the single
best leading (short-term) economic indicator, anticipates short-term
business cycles. Although there have been bear markets that were
not followed by recessions, there has never been a U.S. recession
that was not preceded by a bear market. Since 1854, there have
been 33 recessions 2 , as determined
by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) 3 -
each preceded by a bear stock market "anticipating" it.
Most relevant for our purposes, the stock market anticipated the
end of each recession with bear-market lows, or troughs, six months
on average before the official end of those recessions.
Years ago, Bob Bronson, principal of Bronson Capital Markets Research,
developed a useful model for predicting certain aspects of the
occurrence characteristics of both stock-market and economic cycles.
The template for this model graphically illustrates that the model
not only explains the interrelationship of these past cycles with
a high degree of accuracy - a minimum condition for any meaningful
model, but it also has been, and should continue to be, a reasonably
accurate forecasting tool.
The stock-market and business cycles forecasting model
The first three charts that follow ( Exhibit
B ) illustrate Bronson’s Stock-Market and Economic Cycle
Template (SMECT) for this model by incrementally overlaying several
recognized business cycles. The template incorporates multiple
cycles: the Kitchin 4 cycle, the Juglar 5 cycle,
the Kuznets 6 cycle, and two so-called
long-memory 7 cycles: the Bronson Asset
Allocation Cycle (BAAC) Supercycle 8 and
the Kondratieff 9 cycle (K-cycle) 10 .
The template makes readily apparent several significant observations
about the model. The model integrates and further supports the
validity of the recognized Kitchin, Juglar, Kuznets, and Kondratieff
business (or economic) cycles, as well as introduces their applicability
to their associated stock-market cycles 11 .
The model further establishes the validity and pivotal importance
of Bronson’s BAAC Supercycles, which Bronson has long contended
is the missing link between the Kuznets and Kondratieff cycles.
Thus, this model is - as was Bronson’s intention in designing
it - the most comprehensive chronology of the interrelationships
between classical business and stock-market cycles.
The question is, does this model help us understand stock-market
and business cycles sufficiently and provide sufficient information
to meaningfully forecast significant aspects of these cycles? It
is clear from the template that the model not only explains historical
data with an extremely high degree of accuracy, but it also shows
that the interrelationships between these cycles continue to be
emergent - that is, they have become stronger. Therefore, we expect
this model to continue to be a good predictor in the future - probably
for at least the next 30 years - despite market efficiency and
any model misspecifications 12 , especially
since it is integrated with Bronson’s other submodels, factors,
and indicators in his overall forecasting models 13 .
Based on historical facts, the theory underlying Bronson’s
model demonstrates that the long-memory K-cycle also is directly
linked to the secular (long-term) cycles in the stock market (a
subject of heated debate among some K-cycle adherents). In fact,
the model explains exactly why and how the K-cycle has lengthened
some 10 years 14 without resorting
to explanations such as longer-life demographics, expanding technology-innovation
eras, and other factors that may be more consequential than causal.
Additionally, the template illustrates in a natural and important
setting the applicability of Bronson’s Growth Cycle 15 (see Exhibit
C ) to stock-market and business cycles.
More importantly, historical data supports the underlying theory
that these cycles are linked in a binary harmonic sequencing
that is primarily trough-synchronized 16 .
That is, the cycles can be nested one within another by lining
up their troughs, with every other bottom of one cycle also the
bottom of the next larger cycle, in a predictably regular sequence,
or progression (see Exhibit
B ). The four charts in Exhibit D illustrate the historical
data from the four most recent Supercycles, which cover the 28
Kitchin business cycles since 1896, including the 21 NBER-designated
recessions, and the minimum set 17 of
30 associated bear stock markets, including the false-positives
(bear markets that did not lead to recession) 18 .
Significantly, the SMECT model also provides more refined timing
for the more frequent and/or more severe bear stock markets, as
well as the recessions they anticipate, that we have been forecasting
for the current deflationary Supercycle bear market period since
its beginning, which we called on October 7, 1997, exactly when
it occurred. 19
Since the K-cycle does not distinguish different levels of economic
growth during its uptrend (in K-cycle terminology, upgrade) and
downtrend (downgrade), 20 it serves
as a useful net-cycle-neutral collective for measuring the net
effects of policy-making intervention by monetary and fiscal authorities.
By dividing the number of NBER recessions into the number of years
in the K-cycle - which has lengthened by 10 years (endnote 14)
- we can see that the NBER-designated business cycle has lengthened
from about 3.4 years to about 5.0 years 21 since
the Modern Policymaking Era began in 1913. 22
The BAAC Supercycle, unlike the K-cycle, distinguishes high and
low secular-growth periods in the economy. During the last three
Supercycle bull market periods, there were a total of only
6 recessions whose durations aggregated only 63 months, thus averaging
10.5 months per such recession ( See Exhibit
A ). But during the last three Supercycle bear market
periods, there were a total of 13 recessions, or twice as many,
and their durations aggregated to 209 months, or more than three
times longer, so that their average duration was 16.1 months, or
53% longer. This is evidence of significantly higher economic
growth during Supercycle bull market periods, and significantly lower economic
growth during the Supercycle bear market periods.
In contrast, the 14 recessions during the upgrade phases of the
K-cycle (see also Exhibit A )
closely matches the 15 recessions during the downgrade phases of
the last two K-cycles 23 (with a Supercycle
bull and a Supercycle bear market period in each K-cycle
phase). This close match reflects very similar underlying economic
growth during those upgrade and downgrade phases of the K-cycle.
Note that all of this is consistent with Bronson’s claim
that policymaking interventions, which have increased during the
Modern Policymaking Era since 1913, not only have lengthened the
NBER-defined business cycle, but also show up in the secular over-
and underperformance of both the economy and the stock market that
is reflected in BAAC Supercycle bull and bear market periods. Thus,
Supercycles are important in the integration and understanding
of the whole range of recognized business cycles.
SMECT forecasts
The end of the previous BAAC Supercycle bull market period and
the start of the current BAAC Supercycle bear market period were
marked by the peak in equity asset-allocation vs. money markets
and by the peaks in total return in the equally-weighted (or
unweighted) and capitalization-weighted indices for all of the
currently about 6,000 publicly-traded US common stocks, as follows
(see also Exhibit F ):
| |
equally-weighted
(small caps) |
capitalization-weighted
(large caps) |
| Stock-market asset-allocation highs compared
to money markets: |
10/7/97 |
7/16/99 |
| Total return (dividends reinvested) highs: |
4/21/98 |
3/24/00 |
Since 10/7/97, we have been forecasting that the stock market
will probably significantly underperform money markets from
these two indices’ respective asset-allocation peaks for
about 16 (±4) years through their bear market lows at the
end of the Supercycle bear market period in approximately October
2014.
We have also been forecasting that this Supercycle bear market
period will probably consist of four (± 1) Kitchin business-cycle
contractions, which will probably also be NBER-designated recessions
(depending on the extent and effectiveness of policymaking intervention
at the time), the first of which started in March 2001. Each contraction
will have a bear market anticipating it, though one or more bear
markets may not be followed by recession, depending again on policymakers.
The approximate timing of these business cycles is indicated in
the bottom panel of the SMECT template on the second page of Exhibit
D .
Therefore, we expect that overall economic growth probably also
will be significantly lower during this Supercycle bear market
period than during the preceding Supercycle bull market period
(1982-97/99), which only experienced one recession from July 1990
to March 1991.
1 The Modern Policymaking
Era began in 1913, the year that Congress passed legislation to
establish the Federal Reserve System and added individuals to the
federal income rolls (corporations were already being taxed). This
new era of dramatically increased monetary and fiscal policymaking
authority was first stress-tested during the Great Depression.
The powers and scope of policymaking expanded rapidly in the 1930s
and have grown exponentially ever since. For example, individual
and corporate income taxation in relation to the total US economy
has grown more than tenfold since then.
Most policymaking interventions have resulted in an
increased cost of producing goods and services, which is passed
on to businesses and consumers in higher prices, thereby initiating
a secular rise in the rate of price inflation that arguably started
from the deflationary lows of the early 1930s. However, the SMECT
model considers only the effects of such interventions on the frequency
and severity of business cycles and the stock-market cycles that
anticipated them.
2 Stock-market and business
cycles are economically useful because they systematically correct
the inevitable, periodic accumulation of excesses in the stock
market and economy. Such cycles are both self-correcting and corrected
by policymakers. It can be argued that because of incomplete understanding
and imperfect vision, policymaking interventions lead to inevitable
unintended consequences, so that an appropriate balance between
the two types of corrective forces is dynamically sought, attempting
to effect maximum equity for people, businesses, and industries.
3 It is important to note
that the NBER uses a substantially subjective definition of “recession.” While
two successive quarters of negative GDP is a popular definition
of a recession, the NBER defines it as a period of significant decline
in total output, income, employment, and trade, usually lasting
from six months to a year, and marked by widespread contractions
in many sectors of the economy - a definition purposely
designed to have a lot of wiggle room. Not all Kitchin (see endnote
4) business-cycle contractions have led to NBER-declared recessions
(see Exhibit A ). Those
that have come up short are usually called slowdowns, mini- or
growth recessions, and/or credit crunches (e.g., 1966).
4 In 1923, Joseph Kitchin
published in the Harvard University Press an article entitled, “Review
of Economic Statistics,” outlining his discovery of a primarily
inventory-driven 40-month business cycle, based on his study of
U.S. and U.K. statistics from 1890-1922. The actual nomenclature “Kitchin
cycle” was first used by economist Joseph A. Schumpeter (1883-1950).
5 Clement Juglar (1891-1905),
an economist considered “the father of the business cycle,” studied
the fluctuations in prices and interest rates in the 1860s. He
determined there were boom-and-bust cycles of prosperity, crisis,
liquidation, and recession.
6 Economist Simon Kuznets
(1901-1985) researched the U.S. real-estate cycle, work for which
he was awarded the Nobel Prize. Kuznets studied under Wesley C.
Mitchell (1875-1958), who with Arthur F. Burns (1904-1987) wrote
the definitive book on classical business cycles, Measuring
Business Cycles, in 1946. In 1920, Mitchell founded the National
Bureau of Economic Research, which has since dated every recession
since 1854.
7 Long memory cycles reflect
long-range dependence processes that cause the cycles to be mean-reverting.
8 A Bronson Asset Allocation
Cycle (BAAC) Supercycle is composed of one Supercycle bull followed
by one Supercycle bear market period, or vice versa. A Supercycle bear market
period is a 12- to 20-year period of underperformance during
which bear markets, anticipating economic recessions, typically
are at least twice as frequent and/or twice as severe as during
Supercycle bull market periods. Such a period begins when the return
on money markets sustainably exceeds the total return on equities,
especially when downside-volatility-risk (DVR) is taken into account
(see note 17 ). A Supercycle bull market
period is a 12- to 20-year period of overperformance during
which bear markets typically are only half as frequent and/or half
as severe as during Supercycle bear market periods. Such a period
begins when the total return on equities sustainably exceeds the
return on money markets, ignoring DVR. A copy of our BAAC report,
which explains this and other aspects of BAAC Supercycles, including
the details of the computational methodology, may be requested
by private e-mail.
9 In analyzing 150 years
of commodity pricing history, Russian economist Nikolai D. Kondratieff
(1892-1930?) discovered a supercycle of roughly three generations,
now called the Kondratieff Wave or Cycle, or K-cycle. In a series
of articles between 1922-28, he wrote that K-cycle theory suggested
a coming depression in Western economies. Unfortunately, he angered
the Communists by also correctly predicting that the cycle would
be self-correcting and that the capitalist democracies would survive
the Great Depression, a conclusion for which he was exiled to a
gulag in 1930 - one of the few economists ever to have been exiled
for their views. He was put in solitary confinement, became mentally
ill and died.
The hyperinflation-deflation K-cycle has been connected
with Schumpeter’s technology-innovation, “creative
destruction” cycle, about which we heard so much during the
technology-stock bubble of the late 1990s. Today, many agree that
there are four progressive economic phases of the K-cycle: K-cycle
spring, reflation; K-cycle summer, inflation; K-cycle autumn -
what some call the plateau, disinflation; and K-cycle winter, deflation
- what some call the fall from (the) plateau. The term, deflation,
is highly debated since some think it conjures economic depression
or total debt liquidation, but we do not necessarily use or mean
it in that way. Furthermore, some subdivide the K-cycle winter
into smaller technical patterns of inflation, nominal and real
interest rates, which are consistent with SMECT, but for proprietary
reasons, we prefer not to address their relevance in our work at
this time.
10 "Cycle" refers
to one uptrend followed by one downtrend, or vice versa. It is
important to note that these cycles are quasi-periodic cycles
- not fixed time cycles. The four-year Kitchin cycle, for
example, historically has varied within a range of ±25%
- that is, more than 90% of the time, the cycle has been no shorter
than three years or longer than five years. The much longer K-cycle
has only by about one-half as much variability. This decreased
variability is because the nested cycles that comprise it often
exhibit the self-correcting mechanism of pattern alternation, whereby
shorter cycles tend to be followed by offsetting longer cycles,
and vice versa, so that a series of many shorter or many longer
cycles do not tend to stack up. Thus, the cumulative range (error
from the mean) cuts in half. This constitutes some statistical
proof that SMECT is a cohesive system of meaningfully interrelated
cycles.
11 We attribute the same
names to the stock-market cycles for ease of communication, fully
recognizing that the namesake economists were only dealing with
business cycles. The four-year, or Kitchin, stock market cycles
nest sequentially in their aggregating Juglar, Kuznets, and Supercycle
counterparts. (See Exhibit
B ) K-cycle stock-market cycles are not meaningful in this
respect.
12 Although SMECT was
developed over many years of observation, study, and forecasting
implementation, like all models, it still may not be optimally
designed. Any design flaws would most likely be because of market
efficiency, which results from the self-fulfilling or self-defeating
feedback from competitive observers and participants in any activity
whereby they can observe data, including stock-market and economic
activity, and react to it, changing the outcome.
13 Over the past 35 years,
Bob Bronson, principal of Bronson Capital Markets Research, developed
knowledge-based, “expert-system” forecasting models
that quantify monetary/economic, valuation/sentiment, political/social,
and inter- and intra-market technical data, adapted and reweighted
in light of dynamic market changes.
14 Many people think the
Krondratieff cycle has an average period of about 53-54 years,
but we believe that it has progressively lengthened by about 10
years to about 64 (± 4) years since the start of the Modern
Policymaking Era in 1913 (see note 21 ).
Bronson’s research and his SMECT model show that since the
early 1800s, K-cycles usually have been composed of 16 Kitchin
cycles (2 Kitchins/Juglar x 2 Juglars/Kuznets x 2 Kuznets/BAAC
Supercycle x 2 BAAC Supercycles/K-cycle =16 Kitchins/K-cycle).
And originally Kitchin (see endnote 4) and others found
the business cycle to be about 40 months long, so that the K-cycle
was running about 53.3 years (= 16 x 40 / 12). But progressively
over the past four to five decades, the Kitchin business cycle
and the four-year presidential election cycle have morphed together,
so that the Kitchin cycle has been averaging 48 months in the post-World
War II period, and especially in the past four decades. Thus, the
K-cycle has been progressively lengthening and is currently about
64 years (= 16 x 48 / 12), which is likely to be its final limit
state because the current institutionalized form of the 48-month
presidential election cycle is very likely to be very long-term
stable.
15 Developed years ago
by Bob Bronson, the Growth Cycle is a multi-fractal pattern-recognition
tool that reconciles all possible chart pattern configurations.
See the Growth Cycle template in Exhibit
C .
16 They are also peak-synchronized,
but the trough synchronization is stronger. This is because the
mid-term Congressional elections (early November in years 4 modulus
2 - e.g., 2002) have become a bear-stock-market low attractor,
which Bronson has demonstrated in a separate research report.
17 To avoid “pick
and choose” statistical bias and over-fitting the data set,
the bear stock markets that anticipated these 28 Kitchin business
cycles and 21 NBER-designated recessions were drawn from the smallest
explanatory set of them ranked by their severity (see Exhibit
E ). For these purposes, severity is defined as magnitude times
duration, which is an approximation of our Downside-Volatility-Risk
(DVR) metric - see note 8 . This severity
approximation of DVR was used because the calculation of DVR requires
daily data that is not fully available over all of the historical
time periods involved in this study.
18 Those bear markets
did anticipate short-term, or Kitchin, business-cycle slowdowns,
which did not meet the NBER’s threshold for recession (see
note 3 ).
19 At that time, we issued
our lengthy report, “The Case for the Third Supercycle Bear
Market Period of This Century,” which may be requested by
private e-mail.
20 It has been long recognized
that the K-cycle reflects the long memory cyclical rise and fall
of price inflation (goods and services) and interest rates. This
can been generalized as the rise and fall of price and monetary
inflation since interest rates can be regarded as the inflation
rate of credit money. However, we find no satisfactory explanation
in published economic literature of exactly why the K-cycle doesn’t
reflect secular trends in overall economic growth. That is, why
is the growth rate in the economy, or aggregate production of goods
and services rather than their prices, substantially similar during
the K-cycle’s so-called upgrade and downgrade, or up and
down cycle-trends?
We offer the following explanation in frequency modulation
terms: the K-cycle is the carrier frequency for its half-period
subcycle, the BAAC Supercycle, which is the signal frequency, and
their cycle troughs (not peaks) are synchronized. Thus, the K-cycle
is a modulated carrier frequency with respect to economic growth.
And while its unmodulated peak reflects the peak in price inflation
and interest rates, that peak is really an economic growth trough,
as illustrated by the “missing peak, double peak” chart, Exhibit
G .
Here is why. Following a trough in the K-cycle, which
is fully synchronized with its first four binary subcycles (Supercycle,
Kuznets, Juglar and Kitchin cycles), the BAAC Supercycle and K-cycle
are trending up together, and consequently, real, or inflation
adjusted, economic growth is progressively higher than normal.
This is the high-growth reflationary economic period, or so-called
K-cycle spring. But following that spring season is the K-cycle
inflationary economic summer, a Supercycle bear market period,
where the carrier and signal cycles trend in opposite directions
with the K-cycle continuing to trend up while the Supercycle turns
and trends down. Because price inflation and interest rates are
progressively rising to their eventual K-cycle peak, and are thus
higher than historically normal, real economic growth progressively
slows during the K-cycle summer. Consequently, at the end of the
K-cycle summer and beginning of the K-cycle autumn, the turning
point peak in price inflation and nominal interest rates is exactly
simultaneous with the trough in progressively slowing Supercycle-measured
economic growth.
Following the K-cycle summer peak, when price inflation
and interest rates start progressively declining from their very
high peak levels, economic growth turns around and starts expanding
during that BAAC Supercycle bull market period. This is the second
period where the Supercycle and K-cycle are trending in opposite
directions forming the second peak illustrated in the Exhibit
G "missing peak, double peak" chart.
Furthermore, this modulated carrier frequency (cycle)
concept for the K-cycle explains why stock market manias occur
at the midpoints of the K-cycle upgrades and downgrades - at the
end of each Supercycle bull market period, or the end of the K-cycle
spring and autumn economic seasons. This is illustrated for the
current K-cycle since its 1949 trough in Exhibit
H , along with our latest expectations. Stock market manias
occur because investors become over exuberant following an extended,
or Supercycle, period of economic growth where inflation and interest
rates are still at moderate levels, measured on a historical basis.
Of course, to those without a multi-generational long memory and
only a casual understanding of these things, it seems like the
business cycle has been conquered by policy-makers with no end
in sight for continuing, if not escalating extant prosperity, in
the then widely perceived and apparently obvious New Economic Era.
Finally, pattern alternation in these economic environments
explains why every other stock market mania is a super mania with
multiple technology bubbles, which always emerge at the end of
K-cycle autumns or what some call plateau periods (see note 9 ),
that occurred in the late-1850s, the late-1920s, and most recently,
the late-1990s. The end of these disinflationary economic Supercycle
bull market periods, not only occurred at moderate levels of price
inflation and interest rates, but investors, consumers, businesses
and policy-makers all believed that these economic indicators would
only get “better” by continuing to decline - which
they did, and always will - during deflationary Supercycle K-cycle
winters.
Since future expectations for these economic indicators
are completely distinguishable from the previous mania when price
inflation and interest rates continued to rise, this is not lost
upon even the most seasoned investors, consumers, businesses and
policy-makers, which creates a permabull mass psychology - all
believing that this (mania) time is really different. Thus, they
all eagerly agree to create even more and bigger technology-based
bubbles in the stock market than the previous generation did. And
during the next stock market mania, the comparative logic of these
competitive observer-participants reverses - and so the bigger-smaller
pattern alternation in multi-generational stock market manias continues.
There are two economic reasons these every-other super
manias occur, and will reoccur. First, since inflation rates are
at historically moderate levels at the end of disinflationary K-cycle
autumns and they continue to decline during the following K-cycle
winters, there is no real capital competition from tangible (hard)
capital market assets - commodities and real estate - so that trend-following,
performance-oriented investors and businesses concentrate in acquiring
more highly liquid, financial (intangible) capital market assets
- stock and bonds. Second, because interest rates, and thus debt
service cash outlays, are declining, consumers and businesses also
borrow excessively, especially to fund their equity asset purchases
and investments. Thus, debt-based malinvestment progressively characterizes
K-cycle autumns leading to super manias and inevitable deflationary
economic Supercycle bear market periods, or K-cycle winters.
21 That is, 54 years/16
recessions, or 3.4 years per business cycle → 64/13, or almost
5 years per business cycle, since there were 16 NBER-designated
recessions from 1858 through 1921 during the next-to-last peak-to-peak
K-cycle, and only 13 such recessions during the last peak-to-peak
K-cycle from 1921 through 1982 (see Exhibit
A ).
22 The increasing intervention
by fiscal and monetary policymakers - ever more frequently and
more extensively - to mitigate recessions and lengthen expansions
in the economy has met with increasing success, if measured over
long enough periods, which we argue are minimally BAAC Supercycles.
In part because of this intervention, U.S. recessions, as determined
by the NBER, have become less frequent, decreasing in number from
about one every less than four years in the 1800s, to about one
every five years since then, if averaged over a long enough period.
While the NBER business cycle has lengthened, the Kitchin
business cycle has remained about four years (see note 14 )
and, as Bronson has demonstrated elsewhere, both the Kitchin business
cycle and stock market cycle are fundamentally synchronized to
the four-year U.S. presidential election cycle.
However, those familiar with Bronson’s research
on Supercycle periods will recall that he has also determined that
the frequency of recessions varies according to whether a Supercycle bull market
or bear market period is underway, with recessions twice
as frequent, and therefore NBER-designated business cycles half
as long, during Supercycle bear market periods. Conversely,
the apparent lengthening of the business cycle during the past
two decades is largely explained by the less frequent recessions
of a Supercycle bull market period (1982-97/99). (See Exhibit
A )
23 We demonstrate this
model only from the K-cycle trough in 1896 because widely accepted
data is only available for stock-market cycles since 1871 and for
NBER-designated business cycles since 1858. However, SMECT appears
to work extremely well going back to 1815, where we date the fourth
previous K-cycle trough, rather than the 1843 date that some others
use. Further, our price-inflation and interest-rate model, which
covers both nominal and real interest rates, as well as the yield
curve, also confirms these K-cycle peaks and troughs, as well as
the Supercycle marker of the four progressive economic phases of
the K-cycle (see note 9 ).
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